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ABSTRACT 
After 150 years of business, Lehman Brothers ran out of cash and credit and filed 
for bankruptcy on September 15, 2008. As a publicly traded company, Lehman had 
filed all the reports required by U.S. securities law. But the hundreds of pages of words 
and numbers provided no timely warning of lurking liquidity death. The risks of 
triparty repurchase financing and the endgame Lehman would have to play if a self-
magnifying credit drain hit were, as it turned out, inherently opaque. Disclosure, the 
traditional securities law “fix,” was destined to fail in this case, raising the question of 
whether it might fail in others as well. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the financial world, a liquidity crisis is a heart attack.1 When a financial firm 
does not have the cash it needs to operate, it dies. In 2008, Lehman Brothers Holdings 
Inc. (Lehman) suffered such a fatal cash crisis, cardiac arrest.2 Those who owned 
Lehman common stock lost virtually everything.3 
Lehman’s stock traded on the New York Stock Exchange.4 Lehman therefore 
filed the complete package of extensive disclosure documents required by federal 
securities laws.5 Yet all the words and numbers in those filings failed to alert investors 
to a significant probability that the company would suffer a liquidity death. This Article 
asks why, and the answer is not encouraging: extreme liquidity risk is inherently 
opaque. It is impossible to disclose it, in a timely way, to investors. 
Section I describes Lehman’s demise, concentrating on triparty repurchase 
transactions that drained Lehman of liquidity and the failure of last-ditch efforts to 
orchestrate a merger that would have saved something for the shareholders. Section II 
explains that Lehman’s disclosures provided virtually no warning of the risks inherent 
in the repurchase deals or the endgame that Lehman would play out as it died. Section 
III derives lessons learned from Lehman’s experience—in particular that the disclosure 
failure was inevitable.6 
 
1. See Report of Anton R. Valukas at 1402, In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., No. 08-13555 (JMP) 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2010) [hereinafter Examiner Report] (quoting witness’s assertion that corporations 
that go bankrupt die of “cancer,” but “financial firms [like Lehman] die of heart attacks” caused by a liquidity 
crisis); id. (quoting an internal Lehman email asserting that investment banks “go bankrupt . . . because they 
run out of financing, not because the value of their assets falls below the value of their liabilities”).  
2. Id. at 1401–02. 
3. Lehman’s stock price closed at twenty-one cents per share on September 15, 2008, the first trading 
day after the firm filed for bankruptcy, and the stock was trading at eight cents by October 15, 2008. These and 
all other Lehman stock prices are taken from the S&P Capital IQ data on file with author and Temple Law 
Review [hereinafter S&P CAPITAL IQ DATABASE].   
4. Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1 (Jan. 29, 2008) [hereinafter Lehman 
2007 10-K]. All citations to securities filings include filing dates. Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. issued the 
publicly traded stock. That holding company owned a broker-dealer subsidiary named Lehman Brothers Inc. 
Id. at 5. Unless otherwise stated, this Article uses “Lehman” to refer to the holding company.  
5. Section 12(a) of the Securities Exchange Act prohibits brokers from trading stocks through a national 
securities exchange unless the stocks are registered under that Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78l(a) (2012). Companies 
registering stock must file Forms 10-K, 10-Q, and 8-K. 17 C.F.R. §  240.13a-1 (2014); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-
11; 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-13. With exceptions not applicable here, they must also file proxy statements when 
they solicit the right to vote stockholders’ shares. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2; 17 C.F.R.            
§ 240.14a-101.  
6. This Article does not address the contention that Lehman was insolvent before 2008 because its 
Aurora subsidiary originated and sold Alt-A loans; Lehman sold those loans on through securitizations; and 
Lehman recognized neither the losses on the Alt-A loans it held nor the liability created by those it sold. See 
Public Policy Issues Raised by the Report of the Lehman Bankruptcy Examiner: Hearing Before the H. Comm. 
on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 122, 126–27 (2010) (statement of William K. Black, Associate Professor of 
Economics & Law, University of Missouri-Kansas City). That view derives lessons, id. at 132–39, 141–44, 
that are different from those that this Article draws, as this Article concentrates on the risks created by the 
nature of triparty repurchase transactions and the endgame that Lehman—like other financial institutions at the 
time—played out as it lost its life.  
  
468 TEMPLE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
 
I. WHAT HAPPENED TO LEHMAN 
This Section tracks Lehman through 2008, from a promising beginning to 
complete disaster. This Section then focuses on two factors that contributed to 
Lehman’s collapse—liquidity declines forced by counterparties in triparty repurchase 
agreements (repos) and unsuccessful efforts to find, with the assistance of the U.S. 
government, a lifesaving merger as Lehman went down. 
A. The Short Story and the Big Picture 
As 2008 opened, five firms dominated United States investment banking.7 
Lehman was one. Bear Stearns (Bear) was another. Lehman appeared stable, having 
closed its 2007 fiscal year with profits of $4.192 billion compared with $4.007 billion 
the year before.8 Bear looked shaky with 2007 profits totaling only $233 million, an 
almost ninety percent decline from the more than $2 billion the firm earned in 2006.9 
In March 2008, Bear collapsed.10 Its liquidity—access to funds necessary to run 
its business—dropped from $18 billion on Monday, March 10, to virtually nothing by 
Friday, March 14.11 As the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission later concluded, “Bear 
had run out of cash in one week.”12 
Nevertheless, Bear survived in an altered form through a government-assisted 
merger. On Thursday, March 13, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (the Fed) 
made an emergency loan to JPMorgan Chase (JPM) so that JPM could loan the money 
to Bear,13 and the Treasury Secretary told the Bear CEO, “You’re in the government’s 
hands now.”14 On Friday evening, March 14, the Fed told Bear that the emergency 
funding would end that weekend and that Bear had only Saturday and Sunday to make 
a lifesaving deal.15 The government selected JPM as the merger partner for that deal,16 
 
7. ROBERT W. KOLB, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF OUR TIME 87–88 (2011). 
8. Lehman 2007 10-K, supra note 4, at 85. Lehman’s fiscal year ran from each December 1 to the 
following November 30. Id. at 1. 
9. The Bear Stearns Cos., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at F-5 (Jan. 29, 2008).  
10. For useful summaries of Bear’s collapse, see the “Background to the Merger” section of Bear’s 
proxy statement seeking shareholder approval of the Bear-JPM merger. The Bear Stearns Cos., Definitive 
Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 27–36 (Apr. 28, 2008) [hereinafter Bear Proxy Statement]; see also 
WILLIAM D. COHAN, HOUSE OF CARDS: A TALE OF HUBRIS AND WRETCHED EXCESS ON WALL STREET 3–168 
(2009); NAT’L COMM’N ON THE CAUSES OF THE FIN. AND ECON. CRISIS IN THE U.S., THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
INQUIRY REPORT 280–91 (2011), available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-
reports/fcic_final_report_full.pdf [hereinafter FCIC REPORT].   
11. FCIC REPORT, supra note 10, at 289 & fig.15.1, 478. 
12. Id. at 288. Bear’s treasurer later said, “It really went from Wednesday morning to Thursday 
afternoon, twenty-four hours from solvent to dead.” COHAN, supra note 10, at 60.  
13. Bear Proxy Statement, supra note 10, at 28; Bear Stearns, JPMorgan Chase, and Maiden Lane LLC, 
BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS. (Aug. 2, 2013), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/refor 
m_bearstearns.htm.  
14. HENRY M. PAULSON, JR., ON THE BRINK 103 (2010). 
15. Bear Proxy Statement, supra note 10, at 29; PAULSON, supra note 14, at 105.  
16. PAULSON, supra note 14, at 105 (describing Paulson’s call to the JPM CEO at 4:30 p.m. on Friday, 
March 14, in which the Secretary told JPM that “we needed to get the deal done by the end of the weekend”); 
id. at 107 (“Under normal circumstances, I would have preferred to find multiple potential bidders to at least 
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and, throughout that weekend, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and Fed President 
Timothy Geithner urged the merger on JPM.17 Ultimately, JPM agreed to buy Bear for 
about $10 per share.18 The government made the merger possible by loaning $29 
billion to a new limited liability company called Maiden Lane, which bought those 
Bear assets that JPM refused to take.19 The Bear board approved the merger on March 
24, 2008.20 
As Bear agonized through its crisis, Lehman announced on March 18 that it had 
earned $489 million in the first quarter of its 2008 fiscal year—a profit, but far below 
the $1.15 billion it earned in the same quarter the previous year.21 Lehman also 
disclosed a $1.8 billion reduction in asset values (a write-down).22 The second quarter 
was worse, with Lehman projecting on June 9 and announcing on June 16 a $2.8 billion 
loss together with a $3.7 billion write-down.23 On September 10, Lehman published 
preliminary third-quarter figures showing a further $3.9 billion loss and an additional 
$5.6 billion write-down.24 
Bad as they were, these accounting losses did not drive Lehman directly to its 
death. They contributed to lenders’ loss of confidence.25 But so did announcements on 
 
create the semblance of competition. But I didn’t believe there was another buyer for Bear Stearns anywhere in 
the world—and certainly not one that could get a deal done in 36 hours.”). 
17. Id. at 106–07. 
18. Bear Proxy Statement, supra note 10, at 30–36.  
19. Bear Stearns, JPMorgan Chase, and Maiden Lane LLC, supra note 13. JPM also loaned “roughly $1 
billion to Maiden Lane in a loan that [was] subordinated to the loan from the [Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York] for repayment purposes.” Id. JPM would thus “take the first $1 billion loss on the Bear portfolio.” 
PAULSON, supra note 14, at 120. 
20. Bear Proxy Statement, supra note 10, at 38. 
21. Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), Ex. 99.1 (Press Release) 1, 8, 13 (Mar. 18, 
2008) [hereinafter Lehman Press Release Mar. 18, 2008]; Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., Conference Call: First 
Quarter Earnings 3 (Erin Callan, CFO) (Mar. 18, 2008) (transcript on file with author) [hereinafter Lehman 
First Quarter Conference Call]; see also Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 4 
(Apr. 9, 2008) [hereinafter Lehman 1Q 10-Q] (comparing Lehman’s 2008 first quarter income to its 2007 first 
quarter income). Seeking Alpha maintains the text of the Lehman conference calls cited in this Article. LEH, 
SEEKING ALPHA, http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/LEH/transcripts (last visited July 8, 2014). The author 
downloaded the text of the calls into Word documents, then formatted and paginated those documents. The 
cited page numbers are those from the Word documents retained by the author.  
22. Lehman Press Release Mar. 18, 2008, supra note 21, at 13; Lehman 1Q 10-Q, supra note 21, at    
53–54; Lehman First Quarter Conference Call, supra note 21, at 5 (Erin Callan, CFO). The write-down figure 
in the text here and elsewhere is the valuation reduction net of what Lehman called the “impact of certain 
economic risk mitigation strategies.” Lehman Press Release Mar. 18, 2008, supra note 21, at 13; Lehman 1Q 
10-Q, supra note 21, at 54. 
23. Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), Ex. 99.1 (Press Release) 1, 7, 9 (June 9, 
2008) [hereinafter Lehman Press Release June 9, 2008]; Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., Current Report (Form  
8-K), Ex. 99.1 (Press Release) 1, 99.2 (Attach. I) (June 16, 2008) [hereinafter Lehman Press Release June 16, 
2008]; Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 4, 68 (July 10, 2008) [hereinafter 
Lehman 2Q 10-Q]; Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., Conference Call: Second Quarter Earnings 5 (Ian Lowitt, 
CFO) (June 16, 2008) (transcript on file with author) [hereinafter Lehman Second Quarter Conference Call].  
24. Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), Ex. 99.1 (Press Release) 1, 10, 99.2 
(Attach. I) (Sept. 10, 2008) [hereinafter Lehman Press Release Sept. 10, 2008]. As a result of its bankruptcy, 
Lehman never filed a Form 10-Q for this quarter.  
25. Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 16.  
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September 9 and 10 that credit rating agencies were reviewing Lehman for a possible 
downgrade.26 So did September 9 and 10 press reports that a possible infusion of 
money from Korean investors had definitively fallen through.27 In the end, it was lack 
of ready cash that sent the firm to the morgue. As the court-appointed examiner put it 
after an exhaustive study, Lehman filed bankruptcy on September 15 because it “no 
longer had sufficient liquidity to fund its daily operations.”28 
Lehman’s collapse provides the case study for this Article. Bear’s near collapse 
provides the context. The Article now turns to two particular factors that drove 
Lehman’s liquidity crisis: triparty repurchase agreements and endgame failure.  
B. Triparty Repurchase Agreements 
In 2008, U.S investment banking firms relied extensively on repos.29 Lehman’s 
capital structure included billions of dollars of repo financing.30 At the end of its 
second quarter in 2008, Lehman financed almost thirty percent of all its assets by 
triparty repos.31 
1. How Repos Worked  
In a repo transaction, a seller or borrower (typically a broker-dealer or a hedge 
fund) sold a basket of securities to a buyer, and the seller promised to repurchase the 
securities at a future date.32 Economically, a repo transaction functioned as a secured 
loan.33 Thus, when the dealer or hedge fund sold the securities, it received (or 
effectively borrowed) cash from the buyer (lender). When the dealer or hedge fund 
bought the securities back, it paid a larger sum of cash, with the difference effectively 
 
26. Fitch Places Lehman Brothers on Rating Watch Negative, FITCHRATINGS (FitchRatings, New York, 
N.Y.), Sept. 9, 2008; Blaine A. Frantz & Robert Young, Moody’s Places Lehman’s A2 Rating on Review with 
Direction Uncertain, MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE (Moody’s, New York, N.Y.), Sept. 10, 2008; Scott 
Sprinzen & Tanya Azarchs, Lehman Brothers Ratings Placed on Watch Negative; Capital-Raising Uncertainty 
Cited, RATINGSDIRECT (Standard & Poor’s, New York, N.Y.), Sept. 9, 2008. 
27. Susanne Craig et al., Lehman Faces Mounting Pressures, WALL ST. J., Sept. 10, 2008, at A1.  
28. Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 12. The Examiner’s attorneys reviewed “approximately 
34,000,000 pages of documents,” “interviewed more than 250 individuals,” and retained a financial analysis 
firm. Id. at 29, 32, 36. Not including appendices, the report covers 2,209 pages, with 8,197 footnotes. 
29. At the end of the second quarter of 2008, Lehman financed 46% of the financial instruments it 
owned through repos or repo-equivalent transactions, with the percentages for the other major investment 
banks as follows: 50% (Morgan Stanley), 39% (Goldman Sachs), 28% (Merrill Lynch), and 55% (Bear 
Stearns). DARRELL DUFFIE, HOW BIG BANKS FAIL AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 30, 31 tbl.3.1 (2011).  
30. See Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 3 (“Lehman funded itself through the short-term repo markets 
and had to borrow tens or hundreds of billions of dollars in those markets each day from counterparties to be 
able to open for business.”).  
31. See Lehman 2Q 10-Q, supra note 23, at 5 (stating that Lehman had $639.432 billion in assets at end 
of quarter); id. at 84 (stating that Lehman had $188 billion in triparty repos). 
32. FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., TRI-PARTY REPO INFRASTRUCTURE REFORM 5 (2010). 
33. See Viral V. Acharya & T. Sabri Öncü, The Repurchase Agreement (Repo) Market, in REGULATING 
WALL STREET 319, 321 (Viral V. Acharya et al. eds., 2011) (stating that “repos are essentially secured loans”); 
see also Lehman 2007 10-K, supra note 4, at 87 (referring to “[s]ecurities sold under agreements to 
repurchase” as “[c]ollateralized financings”); Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 797–98 (“Lehman’s electronic 
accounting systems automatically treated all repo transactions as financing transactions, i.e., borrowings.”).  
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constituting interest on the loan.34 The percentage of that repurchase payment over the 
amount the buyer paid for the securities was called the interest rate or the repo rate.35 
During the term of the repo, the seller in a sense “owed” the buyer the amount that the 
seller had agreed to pay to repurchase the securities.36 The basket of securities, while 
owned by the buyer, served as collateral in this loan-like transaction because, if the 
seller/borrower failed to repurchase, the buyer/lender could sell the securities and use 
the proceeds to cover or reduce its loss on the loan.37 In accordance with industry 
practice, this Article refers to the seller as the borrower and the buyer as the lender. 
To protect itself against the possibility that repoed securities would not sell for 
their stated value and therefore fully cover the loan if the borrower did not repurchase, 
the lender typically imposed a “haircut”—loaning to the borrower an amount of cash 
below the market (or, if there was no market, estimated) value of the securities at the 
time of purchase.38 For example, if a lender loaned a borrower $90 by paying $90 to 
buy a basket of securities valued at $100, the lender thereby imposed a 10% haircut. 
The haircut protected not only against the possibility that the market value of the 
securities might fall during the term of the repo deal,39 but also against the possibility 
that the borrower and the lender had overvalued the securities when agreeing to the 
repo deal, as might happen if the securities were not trading in an active market so that 
their value was uncertain.40 The haircut accounted as well for the possibility that the 
securities might prove difficult to sell quickly, as might be true if they were thinly 
traded.41 
The haircuts therefore differed for different categories of securities according to 
the risk that the type of security was mispriced, the risk that it might lose its value 
during the repo’s term, or the risk that it might be difficult to quickly sell. Thus, the 
haircut for U.S. Treasuries was quite low, because Treasuries had little risk of being 
mispriced or suddenly losing value and could be immediately sold into an organized 
market, while other securities—such as those providing payments from a pool of 
residential mortgages or commercial loans—carried a greater mispricing risk, were 
harder to sell,42 and accordingly were subject to larger haircuts.43 
 
34. Andrew W. Lo, Reading About the Financial Crisis: A Twenty-One-Book Review, 50 J. ECON. LIT. 
151, 158 n.12 (2012) (book review).  
35. FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., supra note 32, at 5.  
36. Lo, supra note 34, at 158 n.12.  
37. Kenneth D. Garbade, The Evolution of Repo Contracting Conventions in the 1980s, 12 ECON. POL’Y 
REV. 27, 27–28 (2006).  
38. Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1091–92.  
39. FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., supra note 32, at 5.  
40. See Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on the Repo, 104 J. FIN. 
ECON. 425, 444 (2012) (“Higher haircuts could . . . adjust for the uncertain value of the collateral . . . .”) 
(emphasis added)).  
41. ADAM COPELAND ET AL., THE TRI-PARTY REPO MARKET BEFORE THE 2010 REFORMS 22 (2010) 
[hereinafter COPELAND, TRI-PARTY MARKET] (“[M]ore liquid securities are easier to sell quickly, [are] more 
able to [sell into a market that can] absorb a large increase in supply and [are] thus less prone to firesale prices 
. . . . Therefore, collateral which is considered more liquid will typically receive lower haircuts.”). 
42. Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1091–92. 
43. ADAM COPELAND ET AL., REPO RUNS: EVIDENCE FROM THE TRI-PARTY REPO MARKET 12–13, 32 
tbl.II (2013) [hereinafter COPELAND, REPO RUN EVIDENCE]; id. at 51 n.1 (explaining that the article uses the 
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None of the risks inherent in the different types of collateral matured unless the 
borrower defaulted. Hence, haircuts for the same collateral varied from dealer to dealer, 
reflecting lenders’ conclusions that some dealers were greater default risks than 
others.44  
a. Bilateral Repos 
Financial firms engaged in both bilateral repos and triparty repos. Figure 1 
diagrams a bilateral repo—one simply between a borrower and a lender—in two 
steps.45  
Step 1. The borrower sold $100 worth of securities to the lender for $98, with the 
$2 difference constituting a 2% haircut. The borrower promised in this example to buy 
the securities back at the end of thirty days, which constituted the term of the repo.46 
The borrower agreed to a repurchase price equal to the $98 loaned, plus 1% interest 
(the repo rate). To implement this agreement in Step 1, the borrower transferred 
ownership of the securities to the lender, and the lender sent the cash to the borrower.  
Step 2. At the end of the 30-day loan, the lender sold the securities back to the 
borrower. The borrower paid the lender $98.082, with the $0.082 equal to 1% annual 
interest on $98 multiplied by the percentage of one year covered by the loan.47 
Figure 1: Bilateral Repo 
$100 Repo at 1% Rate and 2% Haircut for 30 Days 
1 Borrower Sells $100 of Securities to Lender for $98 in Cash 
 Borrower Securities Cash Lender 
2 After 30 Days, Borrower Pays $98 Plus $0.082 in Interest to Lender to 
Repurchase Securities 
 Borrower Cash Securities Lender 
  
 
 
term “margin” in this revision instead of “haircut” to measure overcollateralization); see also COPELAND,    
TRI-PARTY MARKET, supra note 41, at 47 fig.7 (showing the median haircut—from the beginning of July 2008 
up to Lehman’s bankruptcy on September 15, 2008—for U.S. Treasuries just under 2%, for debentures issued 
by federal agencies about 2%, for mortgage-backed securities issued by such agencies a bit over 2%, for other 
Fed-eligible securities a little higher but under 3%, and for nonFed eligible securities at about 5%).  
44. COPELAND, REPO RUN EVIDENCE, supra note 43, at 13–14, 43–47 (Apx. C).  
45. This figure largely duplicates the one found in FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., supra note 32, at 5.  
46. In the trade, the term was called the “tenor.” Adam Copeland et al., Key Mechanics of the U.S.      
Tri-Party Repo Market, 18 ECON. POL’Y REV. 17, 21 (Nov. 2012) [hereinafter Copeland, Key Mechanics]. This 
Article uses “term” as more intuitive. 
47. See id. at 21 n.9 (describing rate calculation). One percent of $98 is $0.98. The percentage of one 
year covered by the loan is 8.33% or 30/360. Figure 1 rounds the interest payment to the nearest tenth of a 
cent.  
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b. Triparty Repos 
The repos on which this Article focuses, however, were not bilateral, but triparty 
repos. Triparty repos included a clearing bank as the third party. A description of a 
2008 triparty repo financing over forty-eight hours provides an accessible 
understanding of this financing mechanism.48 Figure 2 diagrams that financing in seven 
steps.49 Assume for this example an overnight term and that the borrower was a 
securities dealer.50 
Step 1. The dealer and a lender agreed—before 10:00 a.m. on Day 151—on a repo 
for the coming night.52 The agreement included the amount of cash that the lender 
would provide, the overnight term of the loan, the repo rate, the acceptable securities to 
be repoed (the collateral), and the haircuts on the collateral.53 The acceptable 
collateral54 was defined by categories of securities, with agreements often permitting 
more than one category,55 different haircuts for different categories,56 and sometimes a 
percentage limit on different categories.57 The repos were therefore “general collateral” 
transactions in which the borrowing dealer could provide any securities that fit into the 
categories on which the borrower and lender agreed.58 Although the dealer and the 
lender agreed to the repo by 10:00 a.m., no particular securities were allocated to the 
repo until trading ended.59 
Assume that during that trading day, the dealer purchased Security A (either to 
expand its inventory or to hold as an investment),60 financing that purchase in large part 
 
48. The text describes triparty repos in 2008. See infra note 392 for a discussion of changes since that 
time. 
49. See FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., supra note 32, at app. I (illustrating this process through a 
diagram).  
50. See id. at 6 (stating that triparty borrowers were “typically fixed-income securities broker-dealers”).  
51. This part of the transaction was bilateral. Id. at 9. The clearing bank played no role. COPELAND, TRI-
PARTY MARKET, supra note 41, at 8.  
52. See COPELAND, REPO RUN EVIDENCE, supra note 43, at 41 (“A [lender] and a [borrower] typically 
agree on a tri-party repo before 10 a.m. Conversations with market participants suggest that at least 90% of a 
dealer’s tri-party repos are arranged before that time.”).  
53. Id. 
54. See COPELAND, TRI-PARTY MARKET, supra note 41, at 74 app. B (listing examples of collateral used 
in triparty repos); PAYMENTS RISK COMM., TASK FORCE ON TRI-PARTY REPO INFRASTRUCTURE 19 (2010) 
[hereinafter 2010 PAYMENTS RISK COMM.] (containing another list at a higher level of generalization).  
55. 2010 PAYMENTS RISK COMM., supra note 54, at 37. 
56. See COPELAND, TRI-PARTY MARKET, supra note 41, at 11–12 (providing three simplified schedules 
of collateral and haircuts).  
57. See Copeland, Key Mechanics, supra note 46, at 24 (providing as a simplified example the 
following: “Only U.S. Treasuries, agency securities, and investment-grade, U.S.-dollar corporate bonds are 
acceptable. No more than 30 percent of the portfolio may be corporate bonds.”). 
58. Id. at 20, 21 n.11. 
59. COPELAND, REPO RUN EVIDENCE, supra note 43, at 41–42 (stating that the morning agreement 
determines the “set of acceptable collateral,” but that trades settle with specific securities in the afternoon 
allocation).  
60. See COPELAND, TRI-PARTY MARKET, supra note 41, at 5 (“Dealers hold securities for several 
reasons. Some securities constitute inventories as part of the dealer’s market-making business, others are part 
of the proprietary holdings of the dealer as a form of investment.”). 
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by a loan that the dealer had to repay at the close of business. The second panel of Step 
1 in Figure 2 shows the purchase of Security A. It also shows the intraday loan used to 
purchase Security A. Assume that the dealer planned to repay the loan with money 
from a repo into which Security A would be placed. 
When the markets closed,61 the dealer had many different repos to fill with 
securities62 and many different securities, including the one just bought, that the dealer 
hoped to place in repos. The dealer faced “a relatively high-dimensional and complex 
mathematical programming problem,”63 which could be solved by allocating securities 
among repos in a manner that maximized the dollars borrowed or minimized borrowing 
costs.64 
Step 2. At the point of this challenging allocation, the clearing bank swung into 
action. The dealer kept all securities that might be used in triparty repo transactions—
including Security A—in one or more accounts at the clearing bank. The clearing bank 
provided computer programs to help the dealer allocate securities among repo deals.65 
Using those programs, perhaps supplemented with manual intervention by the dealer,66 
the dealer allocated its securities among repos and locked them into those deals 
between 6:00 p.m. and 6:30 p.m.67 Assume that the dealer allocated Security A to the 
example repo in Figure 2. 
Step 3. Like the dealers, the lenders in the triparty repos had accounts at the 
clearing bank.68 The clearing bank transferred the securities allocated to the example 
repo (including Security A) from the dealer’s account to the lender’s account (because 
the transaction took the form of a sale of the securities to the lender), and the clearing 
bank transferred the cash being loaned from the lender’s account to the dealer’s 
account.69 The dealer then used the cash from the repo to pay off the intraday loan that 
the dealer had taken out to buy Security A.70  
Step 4. In the morning of Day 2, the clearing bank “unwound” the transaction. All 
repos were unwound before 8:30 a.m.—whether they were only for an overnight term 
or for a term of days or weeks, or were open repos that continued automatically until 
terminated by the lender or the dealer.71 In the unwind, the clearing bank transferred 
 
61. See id. at 13 (stating that Fedwire closed at 3:30 p.m. and DTC at 4:30 p.m.). 
62. See Copeland, Key Mechanics, supra note 46, at 23–24 (stating that a larger dealer may have triparty 
repo relationships with twenty or more lenders, with each relationship potentially involving multiple deals on 
any given day).  
63. Id. at 23.  
64. Id. at 26. 
65. Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1086; Copeland, Key Mechanics, supra note 46, at 24.  
66. Copeland, Key Mechanics, supra note 46, at 26. 
67. COPELAND, REPO RUN EVIDENCE, supra note 43, at 42; Copeland, Key Mechanics, supra note 46, at 
24.  
68. Copeland, Key Mechanics, supra note 46, at 19. 
69. COPELAND, REPO RUN EVIDENCE, supra note 43, at 42.  
70. Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1087. In practice, since the newly purchased security would be 
repoed with a haircut, the repo proceeds would not cover the entire intraday purchase loan, and the dealer 
would have to use its own money to make up the difference.  
71. See Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1112 (confirming that all of Lehman’s triparty              
repos—including term repos—were unwound each morning); COPELAND, TRI-PARTY MARKET, supra note 41, 
at 13 (“All repos are unwound, including term[] repos and open repos that are rolled over . . . .”); FED. 
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the securities from the lender’s account (including Security A) back to the dealer’s 
account,72 which was essential as the dealer had to have the securities during the day in 
order to conduct its business—the buying and selling of securities.73 And, very 
importantly, the clearing bank repaid the lender in the unwind by directly or indirectly 
transferring the clearing bank’s cash to the lender’s account.74 That repayment 
constituted an advance—or intraday loan—by the clearing bank to the dealer during 
Day 2.75 That transfer gave the lender immediate access to the cash, which was now in 
the lender’s account at the clearing bank.76 
Step 5. Of course, the dealer wanted to repo the securities again for the coming 
night and would, in the morning of Day 2, make arrangements to do so.  
Step 6. At the end of Day 2, the allocation process would proceed again, locking 
Security A into another overnight repo. 
Step 7. After that allocation, the clearing bank would transfer securities (including 
Security A) to the repo lender, and, this time, the money from the lender would, 
directly or indirectly, travel to the clearing bank’s own account to pay off the intraday 
loan from the clearing bank to the dealer.77 
c. Continuous Funding Through Repos 
Provided that lenders continually agreed to overnight repos in the same amount,78 
the process could continue indefinitely (see the last panel in Figure 2). But the 
particular securities used to collateralize even an open repo could change from day to 
day, as the dealer’s inventory changed through daily purchases and sales. The only 
restriction on this practice was the requirement that the repoed securities allocated to 
each repo each night needed to fall within the categories permissible for that repo.79 
Thus, Security A could be allocated at the end of Day 2 to a different basket of 
securities than the basket to which it was allocated for a repo at the end of Day 1.  
  
 
RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., supra note 32, at 9–10 (explaining that all unwinding occurred before 8:30 a.m. each 
day). 
72. Copeland, Key Mechanics, supra note 46, at 22.  
73. Acharya & Öncü, supra note 33, at 328 (“The purpose of the unwind is to allow the dealer access to 
the securities in its collateral pool to settle sales, which occur throughout the day.”).  
74. The repayment to the lender could be made electronically from the clearing bank’s own account to 
the lender’s account at the clearing bank, or made from the clearing bank’s own account to the dealer’s 
account at the clearing bank, then on from the dealer’s account to the lender’s account. 
75. See Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1418 (confirming that Lehman’s clearing bank advanced an 
intraday loan to Lehman each day in the unwind of Lehman’s repos); PAYMENTS RISK COMM., TASK FORCE 
ON TRI-PARTY REPO INFRASTRUCTURE: FINAL REPORT 5 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 PAYMENTS RISK COMM.] 
(stating that the unwind “required the Clearing Banks to extend intraday credit to the Dealers from 8:30 in the 
morning until all collateral allocations were finalized and ‘locked up,’ in the evening”). 
76. ADAM COPELAND ET AL., POLICY ISSUES IN THE DESIGN OF TRI-PARTY REPO MARKETS 
(PRELIMINARY) 26 (rev. 2011) [hereinafter COPELAND, POLICY ISSUES].  
77. FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., supra note 32, at 10. 
78. This might happen by default. See Acharya & Öncü, supra note 33, at 322 (“Overnight repos 
constitute about half of all repo transactions, and most of them are open; they roll over automatically until 
either party chooses to exit.”).  
79. COPELAND, TRI-PARTY MARKET, supra note 41, at 13. 
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Note that, in the example, the dealer continuously financed its purchase of Security A. 
When the dealer bought Security A on Day 1, the dealer did so with cash from an 
intraday loan. The dealer paid off that Day 1 intraday loan with the proceeds of the loan 
from the overnight repo. The dealer then paid off the repo loan with the Day 2 intraday 
loan from the clearing bank, obtained in the unwind. And the dealer paid off that Day 2 
intraday loan with the proceeds of the repo loan at the end of Day 2. This chain of loans 
permitted the dealer to finance the purchase of Security A for the entire cycle and 
provided the dealer with the advantages (and imposed the risks) of leverage.80  
Figure 2: Triparty Repo 
1 Dealer and Lender Agree to Overnight Repo 8:30–10:00 a.m. Day 1 
 Dealer Buys Security A, Financing the Purchase with a Loan To Be Repaid at the End of the Day 
During Trading on 
Day 1 
2 Allocation of Dealer Securities to This Repo, Including Security A 
3:30–6:30 p.m. 
Day 1 
REPO BEGINS 
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Including Security A 
 3 
Dealer Account 
at  
Clearing Bank 
 
Used to Pay Off 
Security A 
Purchase Loan 
Cash 
Lender Account 
at  
Clearing Bank 6:30 p.m. 
Day 1 
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with Unwind and Intraday Loan 
Securities, 
Including Security A 
 
 
Dealer Account 
at 
Clearing Bank  
 
Lender Account 
at 
Clearing Bank 4 
 Clearing  
Bank’s Own 
Account 
 
8:30 a.m. 
Day 2 
5 Dealer and Lender Agree to Overnight Repo 8:30–10:00 a.m. Day 2 
6 Allocation of Dealer Securities to This Repo, Including Security A 
3:30–6:30 p.m. 
Day 2 
REPO BEGINS 
Dealer Account 
at  
Clearing Bank 
Securities, 
Including Security A 
 
Lender Account 
at  
Clearing Bank 
   7 
 Clearing  
Bank’s Own 
Account 
 
6:30 p.m. 
Day 2 
Repeat Steps 4 Through 7  
 
80. WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 8, 344–46 (11th ed. 2010).  
Intraday Debt 
Paid Off 
Cash 
Cash 
Intraday Debt 
Initiated 
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d.      Haircuts and Collateral Cushion for the Clearing Bank 
Before leaving the structure of triparty repos, both the morning unwind and the 
associated intraday debt that the dealer owed to the clearing bank merit more 
elaboration. While the unwind had the advantage of returning securities to the dealer so 
that the dealer could use them during its business day, the clearing bank needed to 
protect itself during the day—both on the intraday loan it extended to the dealer for 
triparty repos and on any other daytime credit that the clearing bank provided to the 
dealer, such as credit to buy new securities.81 The clearing bank did so through a lien 
on securities that the dealer (and its affiliates, including its parent holding company) 
had in accounts at the clearing bank.82 
During the day, as the dealer bought and sold securities, the particular securities in 
its accounts at the clearing bank changed continually.83 To control the relationship of 
this shifting collateral to the amount of the intraday loan and other daytime credit, the 
clearing bank employed a tool called net free equity (NFE).84 Essentially, NFE equaled 
the amount by which the value of the securities in the dealer and affiliate accounts at 
the clearing bank85 exceeded the amount the dealer had borrowed—including 
particularly the amount borrowed through the intraday loan in the unwind—plus any 
unused, unsecured credit the clearing bank was willing to extend.86 
As long as NFE was positive, the dealer could call on the positive balance for 
cash, but the clearing bank could refuse to execute any transaction to which the dealer 
committed with a third party if consummation of that deal would drive NFE below 
zero.87 Thus, NFE directly affected the amount of cash available to the dealer. 
The NFE arrangement and related lien made the intraday loan from the clearing 
bank to the dealer a secured loan. And just as the overnight lender needed to be sure 
that the repo collateral was sufficient to cover the debt if the dealer defaulted on the 
overnight loan, so the clearing bank needed to be sure that the collateral for its intraday 
loan was sufficient to protect against a dealer default on that debt. To protect against 
the possible insufficiency of the collateral, the clearing bank—like the overnight 
lenders—might haircut the value of the securities in the dealer’s account, before 
computing the value that those securities added to the dealer’s NFE. Dollar for dollar, 
such haircuts reduced the dealer’s NFE, and therefore, dollar for dollar, those haircuts 
reduced a dealer’s daytime liquidity. 
 
81. See supra notes 71–76 and accompanying text for a discussion of the unwind process.  
82. COPELAND, POLICY ISSUES, supra note 76, at 12 n.8. Thus, the Clearing Agreement between 
Lehman’s broker-dealer subsidiary and JPM gave JPM “a continuing security interest in, lien upon and right of 
set-off as to” accounts that the broker-dealer had at JPM. Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1088. In 2008, the 
Lehman holding company guaranteed the broker-dealer’s obligations and gave JPM a lien on the holding 
company’s accounts at JPM to satisfy that guarantee. Id. at 1115–17. New agreements in August, and revisions 
to those agreements in September, expanded the liens and the guarantee. Id. at 1151–52.  
83. FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., supra note 32, at 10.  
84. COPELAND, TRI-PARTY MARKET, supra note 41, at 13–14. 
85. The NFE calculation took into account all the securities that the dealer held in accounts at the 
clearing bank, not just those securities financed by the repos. Copeland, Key Mechanics, supra note 46, at 26.  
86. See Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1093 (describing NFE in the JPM-Lehman relationship). 
87. See id. at 1094 (stating that “[i]f a trade would put Lehman’s NFE below zero, the trade would not be 
permitted”). 
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If the clearing bank concluded that haircuts imposed by overnight lenders did not 
provide adequate protection, the clearing bank could impose higher haircuts during the 
day. Moreover, the clearing bank might decide that it needed some extra cushion—
beyond haircuts on individual securities—to protect itself against the risk that the 
dealer would fail to pay on the intraday loan. The clearing bank might reason that while 
a particular overnight lender—one of maybe sixty88—took only a part of the risk that 
the dealer would default overnight because that lender loaned against only part of the 
dealer’s portfolio, the clearing bank during the day took the risk that the dealer would 
default on the intraday loan that covered all of the dealer’s securities financed through 
triparty repos with all lenders.89 That outsized risk might warrant a collateral cushion in 
addition to haircuts. 
Of course, a clearing bank could only impose haircuts and could only require a 
collateral cushion if it had the power to work its will. The daily unwind provided that 
power. A clearing bank was not contractually required to unwind in the morning. To 
the contrary, the clearing bank possessed the discretion to unwind—and provide the 
related intraday loan to the dealer—or not.90 A clearing bank’s refusal to unwind would 
condemn a dealer to a swift and almost certain death, as without the unwind’s intraday 
loan, the dealer would be unable to repay the overnight lenders and would therefore be 
unable to repurchase the securities that were its stock in trade.91 The clearing bank’s 
ability to virtually destroy a dealer by simply refusing to unwind gave the clearing bank 
enormous bargaining power to demand haircuts and collateral cushions.92 
 
 
88. Lehman borrowed from “over 60” lenders in the triparty market on September 8, 2008. COPELAND, 
TRI-PARTY MARKET, supra note 41, at 56.  
89. Id. at 43–44 (“The [clearing banks’] exposures to individual [dealers] were . . . very large: the largest 
individual portfolio was over $400 billion . . . . This exposure implie[d] that if a large [dealer] were to fail 
during the day, the clearing bank would have to take a massive amount of collateral on its balance sheet.”).  
90. See id. at 14 (“It is important to highlight that the unwind [was] at the discretion of the clearing bank. 
. . . [T]he clearing bank ha[d] the contractual right to refuse to unwind the repos . . . . For example, if a clearing 
bank felt that a dealer might have to declare bankruptcy during the day, it could choose to protect itself by not 
unwinding.”); Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1068 (“[JPM] acted as LBI’s [the Lehman broker-dealer 
subsidiary] principal clearing bank pursuant to a Clearance Agreement between [JPM] and LBI. The most 
significant component of [JPM’s] clearing services was ‘triparty repo’ clearing.”); id. at 1088 (“The Clearance 
Agreement . . . provided for the extension of credit to LBI by [JPM], but at [JPM’s] sole discretion. [JPM] 
could . . . ‘at any time decline to extend such credit at [JPM’s] discretion, with notice.’”).  
91. See Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1135 (“One option available to [JPM] was to cease unwinding 
triparty repos in the morning, which would result in [Lehman’s] default on payment obligations (causing 
government securities not to trade and investors to lock up).”); COPELAND, TRI-PARTY MARKET, supra note 
41, at 14 (“Practically speaking, refusing to unwind the repos of a dealer would almost certainly force that 
dealer into default.”).  
92. Conversations between JPM and Lehman, during which JPM made its last demand for an additional 
$5 billion in cash collateral, illustrate both parties’ appreciation of this power. JPM told Lehman that it would 
not unwind the triparty repos the next day unless Lehman posted the cash. Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 
1163. Lehman’s Treasurer rhetorically asked, “What is to keep you from asking for $10 billion tomorrow?” Id. 
at 1162. JPM’s CEO “responded: ‘nothing’ and ‘maybe we will.’” Id. Lehman posted the $5 billion. Id. at 
1165.  
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e.  Matched Book Repos 
Before turning specifically to Lehman’s repo financing, it is critical to understand 
one more transaction—this one involving both the bilateral repo market and the triparty 
repo market. In addition to using repos to finance securities in inventory and held for 
investment, a dealer might engage in “matched book” transactions. 
In matched book transactions, the dealer loaned money to a counterparty, like a 
hedge fund, in a bilateral repo transaction by which the dealer bought a security from 
the hedge fund.93 The dealer then repoed that same security in the triparty market, 
effectively using the money the dealer borrowed in the triparty deal to finance the loan 
that it made to the hedge fund in the bilateral deal.94 This was profitable if the dealer 
could borrow in the triparty market at a lower repo rate than the hedge fund would pay 
in the bilateral market.95 It was also profitable if the dealer could lend in the bilateral 
market on a repo with a larger haircut, then borrow at the same interest rate in the 
triparty market through a deal with a smaller haircut—thereby effectively getting the 
difference between the haircuts as free additional cash with which to work.96 
Such matched book deals necessarily increased the amount that the dealer 
borrowed in the triparty market. And if the haircut in the triparty leg was the same or 
less than that in the bilateral leg, the dealer used none of its own cash in matched 
transactions. Even better, provided the clearing bank did not haircut the securities 
during the day to any greater extent than the lender in the triparty leg did during the 
night, the transaction did not decrease the dealer’s NFE during the day.97 The matches 
 
93.  See Jeremy C. Stein, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York Workshop on Fire Sales as a Driver of Systemic Risk in Triparty Repo and Other 
Secured Funding Markets 5–6, 8 (Oct. 4, 2013) (describing an example of a “matched book” deal). 
94. See COPELAND, REPO RUN EVIDENCE, supra note 43, at 14 (“To some extent, the securities that [a] 
dealer[] obtain[ed] as collateral in the bilateral repo market [were] rehypothecated by the dealer and used as 
collateral in the tri-party repo market. In these cases, the dealer’s role [was] to serve as an intermediary 
between [lenders] in tri-party repo (e.g., money market mutual funds . . .) and a dealer’s prime-brokerage 
clients (e.g., hedge funds).”); Arvind Krishnamurthy et al., Sizing Up Repo (forthcoming) (manuscript at 7) (on 
file with author) (stating that dealer banks “use repos” in part “to finance repo loans they provided to clients 
such as hedge funds,” “re-hypothecat[ing] the collateral they receive from hedge funds to use as collateral in 
their repos with cash lenders”); id. at 8 (“Repos between . . . a dealer bank and a hedge fund are typically 
bilateral, while repos between dealer banks and [cash lenders] are typically tri-party.”); id. at 16 (describing 
linked deals in which “dealer bank A lends $1 to a hedge fund via a repo (collateralized by $1.02 of 
Treasuries), and then borrows the $1 from dealer bank B via a repo (collateralized by the same $1.02 of 
Treasuries), who then borrows $1 from a [money market fund] (collateralized by the same $1.02 of 
Treasuries).”). 
95. See COPELAND, TRI-PARTY MARKET, supra note 41, at 5 (“The broker dealer earn[ed] profits on the 
difference between interest rates on the bilateral repo with the hedge fund and on the tri-party repo with the 
cash [lender].”); Krishnamurthy et al., supra note 94, at 8 (repos in the bilateral and triparty markets may have 
different repo rates).  
96. See COPELAND, TRI-PARTY MARKET, supra note 41, at 5–6 (explaining that “if the haircut in tri-party 
[was] lower than the haircut the broker dealer obtain[ed] from its client, then the broker dealer [was] able to 
generate cash, which [could] be used to earn an additional return”); see also id. at 65, 66 fig.26 (showing the 
difference between haircuts in the two markets, with the haircuts noticeably higher in the bilateral market for 
all kinds of collateral other than Treasuries and with the spread greater for lower quality collateral). 
97. See Copeland, Key Mechanics, supra note 46, at 26 (explaining that the effect of any haircuts is 
included in the value of a dealer’s securities held in a clearing bank). 
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generated their own leverage, or, put another way, the matched transactions were pure 
leverage deals.  
2. How Lehman’s Repos Went Wrong 
Triparty repos allowed a dealer to finance its securities with debt.98 Moreover, 
repo debt was comparatively cheap, as compared with long-term debt available through 
the public market.99 But the structure of the repos gave both the clearing bank and the 
lenders the power to squeeze the dealer’s liquidity. Lehman felt the squeeze from both 
sides. 
a. Clearing Bank Demands for Haircuts and a Collateral Cushion 
In the early 2000s, there were two principal clearing banks for triparty repo 
transactions—JPM and the Bank of New York.100 A dealer typically selected only 
one.101 Lehman selected JPM.102  
Through February 2008, JPM extended the daily unwind loan to Lehman without 
imposing any haircut on Lehman-owned securities for purposes of computing NFE.103 
So Lehman had (through the NFE arrangement) more available cash with which to 
work during the day than it had during the night.104 
In early 2008, however, JPM came alive to the considerable risk it ran on the 
intraday credit.105 The Fed urged JPM to consider this danger,106 and dealers’ increased 
use of less liquid securities in repo financings further fueled JPM’s concern.107 JPM 
 
98.  See supra Part I.B.1.c. 
99. Like haircuts, interest rates varied with the type of collateral, with repos using more risky securities 
made at higher repo rates. In September 2008, Lehman paid just under 2% for repo financing secured by 
Treasuries, between 2% and 2.1% for repos secured by agency debentures, and between 2.2% and 2.5% for 
repos secured by corporate debt. COPELAND, TRI-PARTY MARKET, supra note 41, at 60 fig.22. All these rates, 
however, were below what Lehman paid for debt or debt-like financing through public offerings. For example, 
Lehman paid 6.75% on $1.5 billion in unsecured ten-year debt in December 2007 and 7.50% on $2 billion in 
unsecured thirty-year debt in May 2008. Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), Ex. 4.01 
(Fifteenth Supplemental Indenture) 2 (Dec. 21, 2007); Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., Current Report (Form 8-
K), Ex. 4.01 (Sixteenth Supplemental Indenture) 2 (May 13, 2008). Lehman also sold three series of preferred 
stock in 2008, with various terms, paying 7.95% on the first sale, 7.25% on the second, and 8.75% on the third. 
Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (Feb. 12, 2008); Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., 
Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (Apr. 4, 2008); Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 
(June 12, 2008).  
100. Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1085.  
101. COPELAND, TRI-PARTY MARKET, supra note 41, at 9.  
102. Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1084. 
103. Id. at 1094. 
104. See id. at 1095–96 (“Before February 2008, [JPM] required no triparty-investor margin, so [JPM’s] 
payment of $19 million cash in the morning to repay the lender (a cash advance for the benefit of Lehman) in 
concert with the receipt of the $20 million of [repoed] securities would give Lehman an immediate $1 million 
‘surplus’ of NFE.”).  
105. Id. at 1094–95. 
106. Id.  
107. See Hearing on “Too Big to Fail: Expectations and Impact of Extraordinary Government 
Intervention and the Role of Systemic Risk in the Financial Crisis” Before the Financial Crisis Inquiry 
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therefore decided to impose haircuts during the day equal to those that the overnight 
lenders required, and so advised Lehman on February 26, 2008.108 Beginning on March 
17, 2008 (after Bear’s near death), JPM started with a daytime haircut equal to twenty 
percent of the nighttime amount, planning to increase to the full overnight amount by 
the end of June.109 JPM incorporated the haircuts into the NFE calculation, thereby 
reducing Lehman’s available daytime cash.110 
JPM then concluded that even daytime haircuts equal to the overnight haircuts did 
not adequately protect JPM on the intraday loan. JPM reasoned that, “unlike any single 
triparty [lender], [it] took on a [dealer’s] entire triparty repo book each day.”111 
Moreover, as JPM saw it, the overnight haircuts did not “fully reflect” the risk that it 
would be hard for JPM, in the event of a dealer default, to sell “the increasingly large 
amount of structured, difficult-to-value securities that were being financed through the 
triparty repo program.”112 Nor did those haircuts adequately account for the risk that a 
dealer had overvalued repo-financed securities.113 
On June 2, JPM accordingly advised Lehman that it needed about $6 billion in 
extra collateral to both reach 100% of the haircut imposed by overnight lenders (up 
from the 20% being covered at that time) and to provide a collateral cushion (that JPM 
called a “risk-based margin”) to protect itself against these additional risks.114 In 
response, Lehman posted $5 billion of collateral on June 19,115 with the difference 
between the $6 billion demanded and the $5 billion posted probably explained by 
JPM’s concession that Lehman could have an extension, from the end of June until 
mid-August, of the deadline to reach 100% of the overnight haircuts.116 Just like the 
daytime haircuts, the collateral cushion reduced Lehman’s NFE.117 
 
Commission 242–43 (2010) [hereinafter FCIC Hearing] (statement of Barry Zubrow), available at http://fcic-
static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-testimony/2010-0901-Transcript.pdf (“The triparty business was 
originally . . . designed to help broker-dealers finance government and agency inventories. And we I think 
collectively woke up as an industry and found at the end of ’07, beginning of ’08, that . . . a significant portion 
of the financing . . . had shifted into less liquid, harder-to-value securities . . . .”).  
108. Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1095 (describing a February 2008 internal JPM recommendation 
to impose daytime haircuts); id. at 1096–97 (“Lehman and [JPM] representatives discussed these new 
collateral requirements . . . on a February 26, 2008 conference call. . . . [JPM] offered to implement this plan 
‘incrementally.’”). 
109. Id. at 1097–98; Barry Zubrow, Written Statement of Barry Zubrow Before the Financial Crisis 
Inquiry Commission 3 (Sept. 1, 2010), available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-
testimony/2010-0901-Zubrow.pdf.  
110. Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1095–96.   
111. Zubrow, supra note 109, at 3; see also Examiner Report, supra note 1, 1099 n.4009 (summarizing 
an interview with a JPM collateral risk manager and stating: “[JPM’s] ‘concentration risk’ to the broker-dealer 
borrower was much higher than that of any triparty [lender].”).  
112. Zubrow, supra note 109, at 3–4.  
113. See Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1099–1100 (describing JPM’s new “risk-based margin” as 
taking into account “liquidation risk” to cover securities’ one-day price volatility and “price risk,” which is the 
risk that illiquid securities are overpriced).  
114. Id. at 1101–02. 
115. Id. at 1102. 
116. Zubrow, supra note 109, at 4; Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1104.  
117. Initially, JPM imposed a $5 billion charge on NFE available to Lehman’s broker-dealer subsidiary. 
Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1104 n.4030. But the Lehman holding company owned the securities posted 
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In early July, Lehman posted another $1 billion.118 And, as time went by, Lehman 
posted additional collateral, sometimes substituting one asset for another.119 By 
September 4, Lehman had posted collateral that Lehman priced at about $8 billion to 
protect JPM against risks posed by the intraday loans created by the triparty repo 
unwind.120 
In late August and early September, JPM disagreed with Lehman’s pricing 
because some of the assets Lehman had posted consisted of “illiquid, structured debt 
instruments.”121 In particular, Lehman had included collateralized debt obligations 
(CDOs) that JPM’s outside valuation consultant determined were worth less than the 
value Lehman assigned.122 When JPM told Lehman that such collateral was not 
acceptable, Lehman responded that it was running out of unencumbered assets.123 
On September 9, JPM nevertheless requested an additional $5 billion in collateral 
from Lehman.124 Lehman posted $4.6 billion from September 9 through September 11, 
with $3.6 billion of this in cash and money market funds.125 JPM then again 
reconsidered its exposure to Lehman.126 Once more, JPM concluded that some of the 
collateral Lehman had posted was not worth the values that Lehman used.127 
JPM therefore decided that Lehman was still $5 billion short,128 and demanded on 
September 11 that Lehman post that amount in cash—indisputably worth its stated 
amount—by the morning of September 12, or JPM would not unwind.129 Lehman 
scraped together and posted that money,130 and JPM unwound the triparties on the 
 
to satisfy this collateral cushion demand, and when the holding company transferred the securities back to its 
own account, JPM charged the $5 billion against the holding company’s NFE. Id. at 1104 n.4030, 1121–22; 
Zubrow, supra note 109, at 4–5.  
118. Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1103. 
119. Id. JPM sought, through this and other collateral demands, to protect itself on intraday exposure to 
Lehman not only from the triparty repo unwind but also from other transactions. Zubrow, supra note 109, at  
5–6. So the numbers are somewhat hard to relate to the repos. See infra note 129.   
120. Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1126. 
121. Zubrow, supra note 109, at 5. 
122. Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1105–09.  
123. Id. at 1106. 
124. Id. at 1134, 1138. 
125. Id. at 1141–43. 
126. Id. at 1158–60. 
127. Id. at 1159. 
128. Id. at 1160. 
129. FCIC Hearing, supra note 107, at 276; Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1161, 1163–65; Zubrow, 
supra note 109, at 7. Although the $5 billion demand was linked directly to the triparty unwind, the amount 
may also have reflected JPM’s concern over its exposure to Lehman on derivative transactions and novations. 
Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1163; Zubrow, supra note 109, at 5. But those exposures seem modest in 
comparison with the near $100 billion triparty intraday loan. Compare Zubrow, supra note 109, at 2 (stating 
JPM’s intraday loans regularly totaled over $100 billion dollars), with Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1130 
(referring to a September 5, 2008, internal JPM document setting JPM’s derivatives exposure to Lehman at 
about $1.9 billion). 
130. Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1165; see also FCIC REPORT, supra note 10, at 333 (“Lehman 
‘delivered the $5 billion in cash only by pulling virtually every unencumbered asset it could deliver’” (quoting 
Lehman complaint against JPM in the bankruptcy)).  
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morning of September 12,131 which was Lehman’s last business day before 
bankruptcy.132 Even so, there was a serious question whether JPM would unwind on 
Monday, September 15, as JPM was concerned that if it unwound, Lehman would be 
unable to find overnight lenders and would therefore default on the September 15 
intraday loan, leaving JPM with assets that might sell for less than the amount of that 
loan.133 
Dollar for dollar, the daytime haircuts and ever-increasing collateral cushion upon 
which JPM insisted ate into Lehman’s NFE, reduced the amount of money that 
Lehman could borrow from JPM each day to run its business, and eroded Lehman’s 
liquidity.  
b. Flight by Lenders Who Proved Information Insensitive Until Shock 
Turning from the clearing bank to the lenders, Lehman’s triparty repo borrowing 
fell off a cliff. As Fed staffers later observed, “the collapse . . . was not at all gradual, 
but rather concentrated in the week before the firm declared bankruptcy.”134 Indeed, 
during that last week, the value of the securities Lehman posted as collateral in triparty 
repos declined by about 37%,135 “from $150 billion funded by over 60 [lenders] on 
September 8, 2008, to $95 billion funded by around 40 [lenders] on September 12, the 
Friday before [the firm] filed for bankruptcy”—a $55 billion drop in secured 
financing.136 And perhaps $21 billion of the $95 billion that remained was trapped in 
multiday repos.137 The lenders on those repos may have wanted to get out but could not 
because their repo contracts made a quick exit impossible.138  
While it is difficult to untangle the impact of all the factors that could have 
contributed to the large and sudden decline in Lehman’s triparty repos,139 some lenders 
 
131.  Zubrow, supra note 109, at 7. 
132. See Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1535 (noting Lehman filed for bankruptcy on Monday, 
September 15). 
133. See FCIC Hearing, supra note 107, at 188 (statement of Barry Zubrow). The JPM Chief Risk 
Officer testified: 
 [G]oing into that weekend, the triparty book of financing was obviously held by [lenders], and the 
question would then come up on Monday morning, the 15th, as to whether or not we would be able 
to do an unwind and provide intraday financing. And certainly over the weekend . . . we were very 
concerned that there would not be sufficient [lender] counterparties to continue to finance on the 
night of the 15th without a strategic resolution of the entire Lehman situation. . . . It certainly 
appeared to us at that point that there was not going to be [lender] appetite to continue to finance 
Lehman’s operations. 
Id.  
134. COPELAND, REPO RUN EVIDENCE, supra note 43, at 19.  
135. Id. at 39 fig.6. 
136. COPELAND, TRI-PARTY MARKET, supra note 41, at 56. 
137. See id. at 56 (quoting Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1536 n.5994).  
138. See id. (stating “it is possible some of the investors that remained with Lehman were stuck in term 
trades and unable to pull back their funds without breaking legal contracts”). 
139. Fed staff later offered this analysis: 
We can think of five reasons for the decrease in collateral posted by Lehman Brothers in the         
tri-party repo market. First, [lenders] . . . may have pulled back . . . to protect themselves against the 
increased risk of a Lehman Brothers’ default. . . . Second, Lehman Brothers was forced to post 
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almost certainly stopped loaning “to protect themselves against the increased risk of a 
Lehman Brothers’ default.”140 JPM’s Chief Risk Officer said later that, by September 
12, “some of the largest [lenders] pulled back entirely, refusing to provide Lehman 
with the overnight financing it desperately needed to keep operating.”141 Repos with 
Fidelity, for example, dropped from $12 billion on September 5 to $2 billion on 
September 12,142 and, at the end, Fidelity was pulling back the rest of its overnight 
triparties from Lehman.143 Lenders may have refused to loan even against high-quality 
collateral.144 Indeed, the triparty repos based on the highest-quality securities—U.S. 
Treasuries and Agency debentures—declined so precipitously145 that the percentage of 
total repos supported by the high-quality securities drastically declined.146  
Importantly, the lenders did not slowly adjust deal terms as Lehman’s fortunes 
faded. Haircuts, by category of collateral, hardly changed at all.147 Nor did the interest 
rates that Lehman paid change when adjusted for type of collateral.148 
 
additional collateral with counterparties for other types of transactions over this time, which may 
have reduced its tri-party repo portfolio. Third, in reaction to rumors of Lehman Brothers’ upcoming 
demise, hedge funds and other Lehman clients were moving their business to other dealers and thus 
withdrawing their collateral from Lehman Brothers. . . . Fourth, the wind-down or deleveraging of 
the short-dated (primarily overnight) matched books in Treasuries, agency debt, and agency MBS 
likely played a part . . . . Fifth, and finally, in facing a run by investors, Lehman Brothers may have 
been selling collateral to raise money. 
COPELAND, REPO RUN EVIDENCE, supra note 43, at 19.  
140. Id.  
141. Zubrow, supra note 109, at 8.  
142. FCIC REPORT, supra note 10, at 331. 
143. Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1161 n.4298. 
144. See COHAN, supra note 10, at 513 (“Lehman’s counterparties and overnight repo financing sources 
‘started to go wiggy on us,’ a Lehman executive said, ‘and once people won’t take your good collateral it was 
only a matter of days before we were in Bear mode.’”). 
145. COPELAND, TRI-PARTY MARKET, supra note 41, at 57 fig.20 (showing triparty repo collateral 
posted by Lehman over time, divided by category of securities used, revealing—between September 8 and 
14—a collapse in repos based on U.S. Treasuries and Agency debentures).  
146. Id. at 58 (“Alongside the decrease in collateral posted by Lehman Brothers, there was a shift in the 
composition of the . . . securities Lehman Brothers financed from high to low-quality collateral. From July 1, 
2008 to September 1, 2008, 70% of Lehman’s tri-party book was financing Treasury, Agency Debentures and 
Agency MBS collateral. In the week prior to filing for bankruptcy, these collateral types made up 63% of 
Lehman’s book and only 11% for the week of September 15. Coincidentally, the share of non Fed-eligible 
collateral increased dramatically, rising to 87% from about a quarter of Lehman’s tri-party collateral.”). This 
may have resulted from Lehman responding to lender flight by selling high-quality securities into markets 
sufficiently deep to avoid fire-sale prices and keeping the lower-quality securities that could not be so sold.  
147. See id. at 59 (“With Lehman Brothers facing a run by investors, we expect this firm to face higher 
haircuts in the tri-party repo market. Haircuts, after all, protect investors from losses in the case of a dealer 
default. Surprisingly, alongside the dramatic decrease in collateral posted, Lehman Brothers did not face 
higher haircuts until just before it declared bankruptcy. . . . [T]he median haircut Lehman Brothers faced in the 
two weeks before declaring bankruptcy was essentially flat until Thursday, September 11, two business days 
before declaring bankruptcy.”); see also COPELAND, REPO RUN EVIDENCE, supra note 43, at 18 (“Even the 
small increases in the margin spread in the last days before Lehman’s bankruptcy are mostly explained by a 
change in Lehman’s tri-party repo book toward lower-quality collateral.”).  
148. See COPELAND, TRI-PARTY MARKET, supra note 41, at 59–60 (data provided by a large lender 
showed that, from September 1 to 12, 2008, the “average interest rate . . . slightly increase[d] from 2.313 to 2.5 
on September 12, based on cash loaned against Corporate and Money Market collateral. The rate increase 
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The lenders thereby treated the repos like unsecured debt—to be discontinued as 
soon as possible when some combination of news suggested that the borrower might 
default—instead of secured debt, which would (after tightening terms) provide 
adequate protection for the lender through the ability to sell collateral.149 Put another 
way, and borrowing with modification a phrase coined by Professor Gorton at Yale, the 
lenders who suddenly pulled away in Lehman’s last days were information insensitive 
until shock.150 That is, the lenders continued to lend—without adjusting terms in 
response to new information—through the decline in Lehman’s fortunes during the first 
and second quarters.151 However, the combination of bad news in mid-September 2008 
(Lehman’s third-quarter loss, adverse credit rating actions, and the end of negotiations 
with Korean investors)152 shocked them into complete withdrawal of their loans to 
Lehman. In effect, even though they were sophisticated participants in the U.S. 
financial system,153 the lenders acted like retail depositors during a bank run.154 
Lenders may have reacted this way in part because many of them did not have a 
plan in place to sell any significant amount of collateral in the event that a dealer 
defaulted on its repurchase obligations.155 Abandoning repos with Lehman—rather 
 
[was] small [and] only cost Lehman Brothers about $13,000.”).  
149. An industry study commented after the fact: 
In the context of the tri-party repo market, the ‘lesson learned’ that stands out the most is the      
over-reliance on short-term secured funding and its presumed stability. Discussions in the Task 
Force emphasized repeatedly that many [lenders] focus primarily if not almost exclusively on 
counterparty concerns and that they will withdraw secured funding on the same or very similar 
timeframes as they would withdraw unsecured funding. 
2010 PAYMENTS RISK COMM., supra note 54, at 19; see also COPELAND, TRI-PARTY MARKET, supra note 41, 
at 22–23 (“Taken to the extreme, the risk management strategy of these [lenders] treats tri-party repo 
transactions as unsecured loans.”).  
150. Professor Gorton concentrates on the bilateral repo market and refers to the collateral there 
changing over time from “informationally insensitive” to “informationally sensitive,” with the result that—in 
the bilateral market—haircuts did significantly increase, which effectively constituted a “run on repo” that 
sapped dealer liquidity. See GARY GORTON, SLAPPED IN THE FACE BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: BANKING AND THE 
PANIC OF 2007, at 23 (2010) (defining information-insensitive debt); id. at 32, 51 (arguing that a bank panic 
occurs when bank debt becomes information sensitive); id. at 45 (stating that repo lending was designed to rest 
on information-insensitive collateral); id. at 47–52 (concluding that a run on repo occurred when uncertainty 
about collateral developed and haircuts went from virtually nothing to significant percentages, with the effects 
of those haircuts mimicking bank withdrawals); see also COPELAND, REPO RUN EVIDENCE, supra note 43, at 
1–3 (contrasting bilateral market studied by Gorton with the triparty market).  
151. See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text for a discussion of Lehman’s earnings reports in the 
first and second quarters of its 2008 fiscal year and supra note 147 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
the lenders’ unadjusted terms.  
152. See supra notes 24, 26–27 and accompanying text for a discussion of Lehman’s third-quarter 2008 
losses, the downgrade of Lehman’s credit rating, and the failure of Korean investments at this time. 
153. Money market funds loaned “between a quarter and a third” of the total dollar credit extended 
through the triparty repo market, and “securities lenders [loaned about] another quarter.” COPELAND, REPO 
RUN EVIDENCE, supra note 43, at 7. 
154. See id. at 25 (“[T]he tri-party repo market exhibited precipitous reductions in the tri-party repo 
funding of specific institutions, something more similar to traditional bank runs. . . . [Lenders] did not appear 
to adjust, in a gradual way, either the margin or the quantity of cash supplied to the market.”).  
155. An industry study group later found that “[i]n many cases, [lenders] were unprepared to cope with 
the consequences of a Dealer default, in particular the potential need to manage and liquidate collateral 
securing a defaulted repo position.” 2010 PAYMENTS RISK COMM., supra note 54, at 4.  
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than, for example, increasing haircuts in order to ensure that a sale of collateral would 
cover the amount loaned—made sense for those lenders, as they had no strategy for 
selling the collateral anyway. Moreover, money market funds supplied a very 
considerable percentage of the money lent in triparty repos.156 The money funds may 
have feared that, if word got out that they were loaning even overnight to a dealer in 
trouble, they themselves might suffer a run.157 The funds may have employed a 
heuristic gut check: when the money funds viscerally concluded that their investors 
might run if those investors knew the funds were loaning to Lehman, the funds became 
simply unwilling to lend to Lehman at all. 
Whatever the reason for lender flight, the lenders’ refusal to lend ate into 
Lehman’s liquidity. Each refusal to renew a repo on a security created an immediate 
cash problem, as Lehman had to pay off the portion of the intraday debt to JPM 
representing JPM’s advance to pay off the overnight lender who last provided the 
sundown-to-sunup financing for the security. 
To raise the cash to pay the intraday loan, Lehman could choose one of four 
strategies. First, Lehman could sell the security for which it could no longer find repo 
financing (call it Asset A). If that sale reaped the full amount of the intraday loan 
associated with Asset A (as would be the case with a high-quality, extremely liquid 
security), then Lehman could pay off that portion of the loan and, after doing so, would 
have the same cash available for operations going forward. Lehman would, however, 
be smaller. It would have lost whatever business advantages holding Asset A provided 
(e.g., as inventory for sales or as a proprietary investment that might increase in value 
over time and eventually be sold for a profit). Moreover, if the emergency sale reaped 
an amount less than the associated intraday loan (as might be true if Asset A was a 
lower-quality security sold into a thin and falling market), then Lehman, in order to pay 
off the associated intraday loan, would have to reach into its own cash reserves to pay 
the difference. Dollar for dollar, using its own cash to make up that difference would 
reduce Lehman’s liquidity. 
Second, Lehman could pay off the intraday loan associated with Asset A by 
repoing a previously unencumbered security (call it Asset B). This strategy, however, 
might have been practically unavailable when lenders were pulling back without regard 
to collateral but simply because of Lehman’s perceived default risk. Moreover, to the 
extent that Lehman could implement this strategy only by encumbering a higher-
quality Asset B in order to obtain debt financing for lower-quality Asset A that triparty 
lenders would no longer accept, that lower-quality asset became dead weight for 
liquidity purposes. And, of course, the higher-quality asset would now be encumbered 
and therefore no longer available to raise additional cash in the future. 
 
156. See supra note 153 for a discussion of the percentage money market funds and securities lenders 
loaned through the triparty market. 
157. See COPELAND, TRI-PARTY MARKET, supra note 41, at 38 (“[M]oney market mutual funds . . . have 
to worry that they may face withdrawal pressures from their own investors. . . . Upon learning that a money 
fund in which they have invested is financing a dealer perceived to be having creditworthiness issues or was 
financing a dealer now in default, these investors may preemptively withdraw their funds, regardless of the 
risk that liquidating the collateral actually represents. This ‘headline’ risk, the risk that a money fund may find 
itself in the headline of a news story, is another reason why money funds may prefer not to finance a dealer, 
even against high quality collateral.”).  
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Third, Lehman could sell Asset B and use the proceeds to pay off the intraday 
loan associated with Asset A. But this alternative would leave Lehman with Asset A, 
which it could no longer repo finance. Even if JPM would provide an intraday loan 
against that collateral, Lehman could not pay off that loan at sundown because it could 
not find an overnight loan to finance that payment. And, as with the second strategy, 
Lehman would be left with an asset that was dead weight for liquidity purposes, at the 
cost of using up the liquidity potential of a higher-quality security. 
Fourth, Lehman could simply reach into its cash reserves and use part of that cash 
to pay all of the intraday loan associated with Asset A. But this alternative, quite 
obviously, would dollar for dollar reduce Lehman’s cash for operations in the future. 
None of these alternatives appealed to a financial firm facing an ongoing liquidity 
crisis in which more and more triparty lenders refused to lend. Each of these 
alternatives sapped liquidity, except the single case in which Lehman could 
immediately sell a security that had been repoed, but could not now be repoed, for an 
amount at least equal to the amount of the related intraday loan. It is virtually 
impossible to conclude that Lehman was able to implement this alternative to address 
the entire $55 billion drop in repo financing between September 8 and September 12, 
2008.158 Instead, as the bankruptcy examiner concluded, Lehman was “unable to fund 
itself and continue to operate” without repo funding.159 
Just as lender flight reduced Lehman’s ability to finance the securities it owned, 
so too did the flight most likely savage the firm’s matched book business.160 At the end 
of May 2008, somewhere between one-third and one-half of Lehman’s triparty repos 
were the triparty legs of matched transactions and customer funding.161 And the pure 
leverage matched transactions accounted for about one-half of Lehman’s total 
leverage.162 Although no separate figures for the matched book during Lehman’s last 
days are available, there is no reason to believe that lenders who loaned in the triparty 
portion of a match were any less information insensitive until shock than lenders who 
loaned to finance Lehman’s inventory or proprietary investments. Nor is there any 
reason to believe that information-insensitive-until-shock lenders were any more 
willing to finance matching transactions than other deals.163 Instead, the very large 
 
158. See supra note 136 and accompanying text for a discussion of the details of the severe decline in 
Lehman’s triparty repo financing from September 8, 2008, to September 12.  
159. Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 3. 
160. See COPELAND, REPO RUN EVIDENCE, supra note 43, at 19 (stating that the “wind-down” of 
matched books “likely played a part in the decline of tri-party funding in the last few days before the 
bankruptcy”).  
161. See Lehman 2Q 10-Q, supra note 23, at 84 (reporting that total triparty repos were $188 billion); 
Lehman Second Quarter Conference Call, supra note 23, at 14 (Ian Lowitt, CFO) (stating that one-third to 
one-half of $188 billion in repos consisted of matched deals and customer funding).  
162. See FCIC Hearing, supra note 107, at 154–55 (statement of Richard S. Fuld, Jr.).  
163. See Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1161 n.4298 (quoting a September 11, 2008, JPM email that 
states “much of [the] decline” in Lehman’s triparty repo financing “up to last week has been self imposed.”); 
COPELAND, REPO RUN EVIDENCE, supra note 43, at 19 (speculating that Lehman itself might have initiated a 
reduction in its matched book as part of an effort to reduce leverage).  
 But the circularity of the matched transactions obscures causation. For example, a hedge fund using a 
bilateral repo with Lehman to feed financing to it from a matching triparty transaction might be loath to 
continue that arrangement if the hedge fund thought there was a real risk Lehman might go under. And the 
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percentage of matched deals in Lehman’s triparty borrowing and the very large decline 
in triparty borrowing strongly suggest that the collapse of the triparty lending affected 
Lehman’s matched book business in a very significant way.  
Before leaving lender flight, note one last oddity. The government had reacted to 
Bear’s crisis not only by engineering Bear’s merger into JPM but also by creating the 
Prime Dealer Credit Facility (the PDCF).164 The PDCF provided overnight financing 
that replicated triparty repos,165 and PDCF financing ran through the clearing banks, 
using the triparty infrastructure.166 Dealers could obtain PDCF financing only by 
posting high-quality securities as collateral.167 The PDCF was therefore intended to 
address directly a crisis in which triparty lenders suddenly withdrew overnight lending 
against very high-quality securities. For reasons set out below, Lehman did not resort to 
this public lender of last resort even once as the firm’s liquidity disappeared.168 And so, 
forgoing this government backstop, Lehman experienced the full shock of private 
lender flight, which left it clutching its chest and thrashing on the floor in its last week 
before bankruptcy. 
In sum, lenders who were information insensitive until shock suddenly refused to 
lend to Lehman during the week of September 8 through 12, creating in each case an 
 
hedge fund might fear a Lehman default because it got wind of lender flight from Lehman on other deals. 
Similarly, Lehman might not solicit the hedge fund for a matched deal if—as a result of lender               
flight—Lehman was uncertain that it could match the hedge fund→Lehman bilateral repo with a 
Lehman→lender triparty repo. In both cases, the animating cause of the reduced matched book business works 
back to the lender flight.  
 As for the JPM email, it refers to the decline up to, at the latest, September 5, and the passage quoted 
above says nothing about the decline in the week of September 8–12, when repos dropped by a frightening 
thirty-seven percent. See supra notes 135–36 and accompanying text. 
164. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Financial Markets—Promotion of 
Orderly Market Functioning Through an Extension of Credit to The Bear Stearns Companies Inc., 
Establishment of a Credit Facility for Primary Securities Dealers, and Other Actions (Mar. 16, 2008) (on file 
with author).  
165. See Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1389 (“Under the PDCF, the [Fed] would make 
collateralized loans to broker-dealers . . . and in effect, act as a repo counterparty.”); FCIC REPORT, supra note 
10, at 294 (describing the PDCF “as an alternative to the overnight tri-party repo lenders”); Primary Dealer 
Credit Facility: Program Terms and Conditions, FED. RES. BANK N.Y., 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/pdcf_terms_080316.html (last visited May 21, 2014) [hereinafter Initial 
PDCF Terms] (offering overnight lending). 
166. See Tobias Adrian et al., The Federal Reserve’s Primary Dealer Credit Facility, 15 CURRENT 
ISSUES IN ECON. & FIN. 1, 5 (2009) (“The PDCF program is based on the triparty repo legal and operational 
infrastructure . . . .”); Initial PDCF Terms, supra note 165 (“Dealers will communicate their demand for 
funding to their clearing banks. The clearing bank will verify that a sufficient amount of eligible collateral has 
been pledged by each primary dealer participating in the PDCF and notify the New York Fed accordingly. 
Once the New York Fed receives notice that a sufficient amount of margin-adjusted eligible collateral has been 
assigned to the New York Fed’s account, the New York Fed will transfer the amount of the loan to the clearing 
bank for credit to the primary dealer.”). 
167. See FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., DOMESTIC OPEN MARKET OPERATIONS DURING 2008, at 10 
(2009), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/omo/omo2008.pdf (describing OMO collateral as 
“U.S. Treasury securities,” “direct federal Agency obligations,” and “Agency MBS”); Initial PDCF Terms, 
supra note 165 (“Collateral eligible for pledge under the PDCF includes all collateral eligible for pledge in 
open market operations [‘OMO’], plus investment grade corporate securities, municipal securities, mortgage-
backed securities and asset-backed securities.”). 
168. Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1399.  
  
2014] PREDICTING A HEART ATTACK 489 
 
immediate liquidity problem that Lehman could only solve by taking steps that reduced 
its liquidity going forward. Other factors contributed to the liquidity decline.169 But the 
triparty problems—collateral demands from JPM, lender desertion, and the related 
matched book drop—played a key role. Squeezed by the two other sides of the triparty 
triangle, Lehman’s liquidity “evaporated” in its last week of existence.170  
c. Dynamics of Triparty Repos That Accelerated Lehman’s Liquidity Decline 
In part in response to Lehman’s collapse, the Fed and industry participants studied 
the triparty repo market and concluded that—as structured in 2008—that market could 
generate a vicious, self-magnifying dynamic. Thus, as some lenders began to flee a 
dealer, others became less likely to lend for fear that an insufficient number of lenders 
would remain so that the dealer would live long enough to make good on even short-
term loans.171 As a clearing bank considered whether to exercise its discretion to 
unwind after lender flight began, its inclination to do so might decline as it came to fear 
that the dealer would be unable to find sufficient overnight financing to repay the 
intraday loan that the unwind created.172 And as the lenders became concerned that the 
clearing bank might not unwind, they became less likely to lend.173 The different 
participants in the triparty repo structure could thereby have encouraged each other—
once a run began—to continue the run until the dealer died.174 Research has not 
revealed the extent to which these dynamics affected Lehman’s decline, but the speed 
of that decline strongly suggests that such self-accelerating dynamics played an 
aggravating role. 
 
169. Besides JPM, other banks (not clearing repos but clearing other types transactions)—such as 
Citibank, HSBC, Bank of New York Mellon, and Standard Bank—demanded collateral from Lehman. 
Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1223–42, 1279–81, 1284–85, 1303–08, 1376–78, 1382–85. 
170. FCIC Hearing, supra note 107, at 155–56 (statement of Lehman CEO Richard Fuld) (“We had a 
strong liquidity pool, which unfortunately evaporated in three days after the run on the bank ensued.”); id. at 
160 (“We went into that last week with over $40 billion of liquidity. We lost close to 30 of it in three days. . . . 
We needed the liquidity.”). 
171. Because a lender is better off not investing if it believes that other lenders will not invest, “it is an 
equilibrium for all [lenders] not to [lend].” COPELAND, TRI-PARTY MARKET, supra note 41, at 42; see also 
COPELAND, POLICY ISSUES, supra note 76, at 19 (“Each [lender], once concerned that others may run, has a 
clear incentive to run.”).  
172. See Antoine Martin et al., 27 REV. FIN STUDIES 957, 985 (2014) (modeling, under the heading 
“Fragility: Coordination problem between the clearing bank and investors,” the dynamic that could cause 
either the clearing bank to refuse to unwind in light of fears that lenders would refuse to renew repos to a 
dealer, or lenders to refuse to renew repos in light of fears that the clearing bank would refuse to unwind).   
173. See COPELAND, TRI-PARTY MARKET, supra note 41, at 42–43 (“Assume that [lenders] become 
concerned that the clearing banks may refuse to unwind the repos of a dealer. The clearing bank may take this 
action because it does not want to be exposed to the dealer’s failure if it occurs during the day. The [lenders] 
realize that the dealer would almost certainly have to default if the clearing bank does not unwind its repos. 
Hence, the [lenders] will be reluctant to provide repo financing to the dealer.”). 
174. See id. at 43 (“This dynamic is self-fulfilling in the sense that the reluctance of the clearing bank to 
unwind the repos of a given dealer creates the condition for [lenders] not to want to provide repo funding to 
that dealer, which justifies the clearing bank’s concerns. Similarly, the reluctance of [lenders] to extend 
financing to a dealer creates the condition for the clearing bank to prefer not to unwind the dealer’s repos, 
which justifies the [lenders’] concerns.”).  
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C. Endgame 
Just because the actions of JPM and lenders moved Lehman toward a cardiac 
arrest did not mean that the firm was doomed. When a large financial institution faced 
failure, it might merge into a healthier one, and the government might help.175 The 
government midwifed multiple mergers for exactly this purpose during the credit 
crisis.176 In September 2008, Lehman’s turn arrived. 
1. How the Endgame Matters to Shareholders 
Endgame maneuvers are critical to the shareholders of a failing financial firm. 
JPM’s acquisition of Bear provides an excellent example.177 So does Lehman’s 
bankruptcy. 
As discussed above, the Bear endgame succeeded, with the Bear-JPM merger 
yielding ten dollars per share for Bear stockholders.178 The Lehman endgame failed, 
producing only bankruptcy and about twenty cents per share for Lehman stockholders 
who acted quickly, and less than a dime for those who tarried.179 This Article therefore 
turns now to the details of Lehman’s fight for survival and, in particular, the failure of 
the firm and the government to find a buyer for Lehman in the last days of Lehman’s 
life. 
2. Lehman’s Endgame Failure 
Lehman went down fighting. Liquidity is cash, and Lehman brought cash in, 
through more than $17 billion of securities offerings in 2008.180 It at least planned to 
reduce cash going out by cutting its dividend at the very end.181 The firm also reduced 
 
175. Viral V. Acharya & Tanju Yorulmazer, Cash in-the-Market Pricing and Optimal Resolution of 
Bank Failures, in LIQUIDITY AND CRISES 512, 533 (Franklin Allen et al., eds. 2011). 
176. See KOLB, supra note 7, at 184 (“[E]mergency actions led to the merger of Countrywide Financial 
and Merrill Lynch into Bank of America, Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual into JPMorgan Chase, and 
Wachovia into Wells Fargo. All of these mergers were accomplished with the active intervention and 
assistance of the federal government, and all of them were financially assisted by the federal government, with 
the exception of Wells Fargo’s acquisition of Wachovia, which was supported by tax concessions but no actual 
transfer of immediate cash.”); id. at 185 tbl.10.1 (reporting the assets of specific banks before and after the 
financial crisis).  
177. See supra notes 10–20 and accompanying text for a discussion of Bear’s survival through a 
government-assisted merger.  
178. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
179. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.  
180. Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 639–40 (reporting $4 billion convertible preferred stock in April, 
$1 billion senior notes in April, $2 billion subordinated notes in May, $2.5 billion senior notes in May, and $6 
billion common and preferred stock in June); Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), Ex. 3.1 
(Certificate of Designations, Powers, Preferences, and Rights) (Feb. 12, 2008) (documenting an offering of 
$1.9 billion of preferred stock in February).  
181. Preliminary Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc. Earnings Conference Call 3–4 (Richard Fuld, CEO) (Sept. 
10, 2008) (transcript on file with author) [hereinafter Lehman Third Quarter Conference Call]; Lehman Press 
Release Sept. 10, 2008, supra note 24, at 5. The Seeking Alpha transcript for the September call puts the date 
at September 11, but the call occurred on September 10. Heidi N. Moore, Live-Blogging the Lehman 
Conference Call, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 10, 2008, 8:10 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2008/09/10/live-blogging-
the-lehman-conference-call/.   
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leverage during 2008,182 which technically meant reducing the ratio of assets to equity 
and, in plainer words, meant that the firm was funding fewer of its assets with 
borrowed money and more with money that shareholders put in—generally considered 
a way of reducing risk.183  
Lehman took other steps to bolster confidence among those on whom it depended 
for liquidity support. In January 2008, it distanced itself from the residential mortgage 
business, around which the credit crisis seemed to revolve, by suspending activities at a 
subsidiary specializing in those mortgages.184 Throughout the year, Lehman reduced its 
residential mortgage-related holdings, particularly those resting on subprime 
mortgages.185 In June, Lehman changed both its chief financial officer and its 
president/chief operating officer to show its commitment to reverse its declining 
fortunes.186 
Lehman also repeatedly discussed private deals that would inject capital into the 
firm and rid it of problematic assets. Some of these transactions would have radically 
transformed the company by giving new investors a controlling interest or spinning off 
assets or business operations. While none of these efforts bore fruit, they included 
discussions with Warren Buffet, a consortium of Korean financial institutions including 
the state-owned Korean Development Bank (KDB), KDB by itself, MetLife, the 
 
182. Lehman reported both a leverage ratio and a “net leverage” ratio. See Lehman 2007 10-K, supra 
note 4, at 29–30 (displaying Lehman’s financial data and showing how Lehman calculated its net assets and 
leverage ratios). Table 1 below shows the figures: 
Table 1 
 11/30/07 2/29/08 5/31/08 8/31/08  
 
Lehman 2007 
10-K at 29 
Lehman Q1 2008 
10-Q at 72 
Lehman Q2 2008 
10-Q at 88 
Press release included 
in Lehman 8-K filed 
9/10/08 at 19 
Leverage 30.7x 31.7x 24.3x 21.1x 
Net 
Leverage 
16.1x  15.4x  12.1x  10.6x  
 Lehman’s reported leverage ratios may have misled due to Repo 105 and Repo 108 transactions. See 
Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 727–1053 (devoting an entire volume to Repo 105 and Repo 108). But even 
after backing out those deals, Lehman’s net leverage was in fact declining. See id. at 748 (showing net 
leverage without Repo 105 and 108 at end of Q4 2007 (17.8), Q1 2008 (17.3), and Q2 2008 (13.9)).  
183. See KLEIN ET AL., supra note 80, at 8–11 (showing that increasing leverage increases risk).  
184. Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Jan. 17, 2008). 
185. Here are the figures that Lehman reported for total holdings of subprime U.S. residential mortgages 
and securities backed by subprime mortgages: 
Table 2 
 11/30/07 2/29/08 5/31/08 8/31/08 
 
2007 
10-K at 105 
2008 Q1 
10-Q at 20 
2008 Q2 
10-Q at 25 
(Press release) 
Attachment III 
(Ex. 99.2) Lehman 
Form 8-K (9/10/08)  
 Holdings $5.276 billion $4.017 billion $2.755 billion $1.6 billion 
 
186. See Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 615 (stating that Lehman’s CEO “told the Board that he 
intended the management change to be a ‘dramatic’ demonstration to Wall Street that Lehman was taking 
action to make changes”). 
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Investment Corporation of Dubai, and Bank of America (BofA).187 
All of these steps fell generally within the rubric of Lehman’s “survival 
strategy.”188 But Lehman’s true endgame—desperate efforts, assisted by the 
government, to sell the company—began on Tuesday, September 9, 2008, when 
Secretary Paulson called BofA’s CEO to urge expressly that BofA buy Lehman in 
whole.189 After BofA conducted due diligence for such a purchase, it concluded that 
Lehman was overvaluing its commercial real estate assets and that some $60–$67 
billion of Lehman assets were undesirable at any price.190 BofA was accordingly 
unwilling to proceed unless the U.S. government provided financial assistance for the 
deal,191 which the government said it would not do.192 
The government’s determination not to put its own money into a mid-September 
Lehman rescue likely derived from very particular facts. The political backlash from 
the government participation in JPM’s acquisition of Bear in March was fresh in 
policymakers’ minds.193 Even more temporally proximate, the government placed the 
Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) into conservatorship on September 7,194 a move 
that prompted additional criticism.195 And during the weekend coda to the government 
efforts to save Lehman, Secretary Paulson heard ominous tidings of bad news at 
American International Group (AIG),196 which would lead shortly to an $85 billion 
bailout.197 The particular week in which Lehman’s endgame played out—September 9 
through September 15—was therefore a terrible one during which to seek government 
money to help save a failing financial institution. 
Instead of putting in government money to facilitate a merger to save Lehman’s 
life, Secretary Paulson envisioned a private sector solution and convened a meeting of 
 
187. Id. at 651–52, 665–81, 687–96.  
188. That is how the Lehman Examiner categorized these efforts. Id. at 609–726. 
189. PAULSON, supra note 14, at 175–77. 
190. Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 699. 
191. Id. at 699, 701. 
192. PAULSON, supra note 14, at 184–85, 189. 
193. As one Wall Street lawyer told the Financial Crisis Commission later, “It was said on more than 
one occasion that it would be very politically difficult to rescue Lehman. There had been a lot of blowback 
after Bear Stearns.” FCIC REPORT, supra note 10, at 334; see also id. at 330 (stating that on September 9, 
“Treasury Chief of Staff Jim Wilkinson emailed Michelle Davis, the assistant secretary for public affairs at 
Treasury, to express his distaste for government assistance: ‘We need to talk. . . . I just can’t stomach us 
bailing out lehman. . . . Will be horrible in the press don’t u think.’”); PAULSON, supra note 14, at 117 (“[T]he 
[Bear] deal was hugely controversial . . . . Senator Richard Shelby. . . said the action set a ‘bad precedent.’”). 
194. Press Release, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, Statement of FHFA Director James B. Lockhart 5 (Sept. 7, 
2008), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/fhfa_statement_090708hp 
1128.pdf.  
195. PAULSON, supra note 14, at 181 (“All of us were well aware that after Fannie and Freddie, the 
country, Congress, and both parties were fed up with bailouts. . . . And just before our conference call 
[between Paulson, Geithner, and Treasury staffers, to discuss Lehman] had begun I’d spoken with [Senator] 
Chris Dodd, who told me, ‘Fuld [Lehman’s CEO] is a friend. Try to help, but don’t bail Lehman out.’”). 
196. Id. at 200. Christopher Flowers told Paulson on Saturday, September 13, that AIG would run out of 
money in ten days. Id.; see also id. at 205 (“We had gone into the weekend to save Lehman Brothers, and now 
AIG was facing a liquidity crisis that had put it on the verge of bankruptcy . . . .”). 
197. Am. Int’l Grp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Sept. 26, 2008).  
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Wall Street CEOs to put together a plan.198 By the time that group began meeting in the 
early evening of Friday, September 12,199 Barclays, a large British financial institution, 
had emerged as a second possible Lehman purchaser—an alternative to BofA.200 
Barclays’ interest, however, was in a Lehman without certain commercial real estate 
assets and private equity investments.201  
After BofA lost interest on Saturday, September 13,202 the Wall Street titans (who 
continued to meet through the weekend)203 focused on financing problematic assets that 
Barclays did not want.204 The collected CEOs concluded that Lehman—even after a 
recent write-down—valued those assets at far more than their worth.205 If such assets 
were to be bought from Lehman before Barclays bought Lehman, the new owner 
(financed by the Wall Street firms the CEOs represented) would have to take any 
subsequent loss.206 The Wall Street firms agreed to finance that loss and, by Sunday, 
September 14, had prepared a term sheet by which they would commit more than $30 
billion to a purchase of Lehman property that Barclays would not take.207 
Barclays appeared ready to proceed as well, subject to the approval of its 
regulator, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in London.208 But the transaction 
required that Barclays guarantee Lehman’s obligations between the time the deal was 
struck and the time it closed.209 That guarantee, in turn, required an affirmative vote by 
Barclays’ shareholders, which obviously could not be obtained over the September 13–
14 weekend because the necessary procedures to receive an affirmative vote by 
Barclays’ shareholders would have taken thirty to sixty days.210 The FSA had the 
power to waive the requirement for the Barclays’ shareholder vote,211 but it refused to 
do so, despite personal appeals from the President of the New York Fed, the Chairman 
 
198. FCIC REPORT, supra note 10, at 334. 
199. PAULSON, supra note 14, at 191.  
200. Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 703. 
201. Id. at 706–07. 
202. PAULSON, supra note 14, at 201. 
203. See id. at 206 (reporting the CEOs’ position on Saturday evening); id. at 213 (providing Paulson’s 
report to the CEOs on early Sunday afternoon). 
204. COHAN, supra note 10, at 515. 
205. Id. at 517. 
206. Id. 
207. See PAULSON, supra note 14, at 206, 210 (describing the terms of the proposed deal and stating that 
“[i]f Barclays had committed to the deal, we would have had industry financing in place”). 
208. Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 707–08. 
209. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 10, at 335 (“[T]he New York Fed required Barclays to guarantee 
Lehman’s obligations from the sale until the transaction closed . . . .”).  
210. See id. (explaining that a vote could take thirty to sixty days). This agreement was considered a 
class 1 transaction because it included an unlimited and exceptional guarantee. See FINANCIAL CONDUCT 
AUTHORITY, LISTING RULE § 10.2.4(1)(c) (as of Sept. 14, 2008), available at 
http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/.   To accomplish a class 1 transaction, the listed company had to 
send an explanatory circular to its shareholders and obtain their prior approval in a general meeting. See id. 
§ 10.5.1(2). 
211. See Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 708 (reporting the FSA “acknowledged that theoretically it 
could waive the shareholder approval requirement”); FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY, LISTING RULE 
§ 1.2.1(1) (“The FCA may dispense with or modify the listing rules in such cases and by reference to such 
circumstances as it considers appropriate . . . .”). 
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of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Secretary of the 
Treasury.212 The Barclays’ deal was Lehman’s last hope, and when it died, the U.S. 
government suggested that Lehman file for bankruptcy, which Lehman did.213 So, 
oddly enough, it was a foreign regulator that turned Lehman’s liquidity heart attack into 
a no-code death. 
II. WHY NOBODY KNEW WHAT WAS COMING 
With the Lehman story set out, this Article now turns to the firm’s multiple 
disclosures. From the beginning of 2008 until it filed for bankruptcy on September 15, 
Lehman filed the following documents, among others, with the SEC: a Form 10-K for 
its 2007 fiscal year, a Form 10-Q for its first 2008 quarter, a Form 10-Q for its second 
quarter, and a proxy statement for its annual meeting.214 Lehman also issued press 
releases with financial results for the first, second, and third quarters of its 2008 fiscal 
year215 and hosted conference calls in which its top executives answered questions 
from securities analysts about the company’s performance in those three quarters and 
its plans for the future.216 The analysis turns now to whether—when it made sense for 
stockholders to consider the question and when they were still able to sell their Lehman 
stock and recoup some significant portion of their purchase price—these disclosures 
permitted shareholders to predict, at the time the disclosures were made, a substantial 
chance of liquidity death before the year was out.  
To address these questions, Part A selects two time periods in which to analyze 
Lehman’s disclosures: (1) the month of January 2008 and (2) March 10 to June 20, 
2008. Parts B and C proceed to test whether—taken as a whole and looking at their 
effect rather than their content—Lehman’s disclosures during these two periods alerted 
shareholders to looming liquidity failure. The last two Parts then turn to disclosure 
content and ask whether Lehman’s disclosures—in each of the two periods—warned 
shareholders of the risks posed by triparty repos (Part D) and a possible endgame (Part 
E).  
A. The Two Periods in Which To Test Lehman’s Disclosures 
In the discussion below, this Article examines disclosures in two key time 
periods. The first is January 2008. January 2008 makes sense as the first test period 
 
212. See Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 708–09 (noting that Geithner and SEC Chairman Cox each 
called the FSA chair); FCIC REPORT, supra note 10, at 336 (showing that Paulson called the U.K. chancellor 
of the exchequer).  
213. Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 723–26.  
214. Lehman 2Q 10-Q, supra note 23; Lehman 1Q 10-Q, supra note 21; Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., 
Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14-A) (Mar. 5, 2008); Lehman 2007 10-K, supra note 4.  
215. See Lehman Press Release Mar. 18, 2008, supra note 21; Lehman Press Release June 9, 2008, 
supra note 23 (expected figures); Lehman Press Release June 16, 2008, supra note 23 (final figures); Lehman 
Press Release Sept. 10, 2008, supra note 24.  
216. Lehman Third Quarter Conference Call, supra note 181; Lehman Second Quarter Conference Call, 
supra note 23; Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., Conference Call: Preliminary Second Quarter Earnings Figures 
(June 10, 2008) (transcript on file with author) [hereinafter June 10 Preliminary Q2 Figures Call]; Lehman 
First Quarter Conference Call, supra note 21.  
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because Lehman was coming off a good fiscal 2007.217 The mortgage crisis, however, 
was well underway.218 It would therefore have made sense for a shareholder to ask—
when Lehman was still doing well but after the crisis had begun—whether there was a 
real chance that the problems reverberating through the financial world threatened 
Lehman with a catastrophic liquidity event. Moreover, since Lehman’s stock price 
during January 2008 varied between $53.25 per share and $64.05 per share and closed 
at $64.05 per share, a shareholder would still have recovered over half the stock’s 
purchase price by selling in January 2008, even if the shareholder had bought at the 
$85.80 per share price on February 2, 2007, which was the highest price for which 
Lehman stock sold in 2007 and 2008.219 
The second test period begins on March 10, 2008, the first day of the week in 
which Bear nearly died.220 If ever there was a time to consider whether Lehman risked 
liquidity failure, that time arrived when a sister institution suffered such a fate. The full 
evaluation of Lehman’s vulnerability in light of Bear’s experience arguably continued 
through Lehman’s announcement of its final second-quarter financial results on June 
16, Lehman’s second-quarter conference call with analysts on June 16,221 and a few 
days thereafter during which market participants could mull over this news. A warning 
to Lehman stockholders even as late as June 20 would have been timely since, even on 
 
217. See supra note 8 and accompanying text for a discussion of Lehman’s success in the 2007 fiscal 
year.  
218. In June 2007, two hedge funds sponsored by Bear Stearns nearly imploded. Both had invested in 
complex securities backed by subprime mortgages. Bear committed to loan as much as $3.2 billion to save one 
of them. Kate Kelly & Serena Ng, Lifeline: Bear Stearns Bails Out Fund with Big Loan; Injection of $3.2 
Billion Caps Days of Drama; Subprime Sector Fears, WALL ST. J., June 23, 2007, at A1; Kate Kelly et al., 
Two Big Funds at Bear Stearns Face Shutdown; As Rescue Plan Falters Amid Subprime Woes, Merrill Asserts 
Claims, WALL ST. J., June 20, 2007, at A1. By August, those funds had attempted to file for bankruptcy, and 
Bear Stearns’ president/co–chief operating officer had resigned. Bear Stearns Co., Current Report (Form 8-K) 
(filed Aug. 9, 2007); Landon Thomas, Jr., A Top Official at Bear Stearns Ousted over Funds Implosion, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 6, 2007, at C1; Judge Rejects Bankruptcy for 2 Hedge Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2007, at C4. 
In December, Bear announced that it lost money in the last quarter of its 2007 fiscal year, in part due to $1.9 
billion in write-downs of mortgage-related assets. Bear Stearns Co., Current Report (Form 8-K), Ex. 99.2 
(Press Release) (Dec. 21, 2007). Bear’s CEO retired in early January 2008, reportedly in part as a result of the 
company’s poor financial performance during the mortgage crisis. Kate Kelly, Cayne To Step Down as Bear 
Stearns CEO, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 2008, at A1.  
 Other companies had also suffered reverses. Countrywide, the largest mortgage lender in the United 
States, reported its first loss in twenty-five years in October 2007 while writing down $690 million on home 
equity lines and subprime loans. Gretchen Morgenson, Countrywide Is Upbeat Despite Loss, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
27, 2007, at C1, C9. Morgan Stanley reported its first quarterly loss in seventy-two years in December 2007, 
occasioned in part by a $9.4 billion write-down of mortgage-related assets. Landon Thomas, Jr., Wall St. Firm 
Reports Loss, Its First Ever, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2007, at C1.  
219. S&P CAPITAL IQ DATABASE, supra note 3. Those who contend that Lehman’s stock price was 
inflated through accounting fraud would see no advantage in sales prompted by such a warning. They would 
argue that sellers would simply have passed an inevitable loss on to buyers. The SEC investigated Lehman 
extensively. It has never filed an enforcement action against the Lehman principals. See Peter J. Henning, Dim 
Prospects for Financial Crisis Prosecutions, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2012, 3:13 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/dim-prospects-for-financial-crisis-prosecutions/.  
220. See supra notes 10–15 and accompanying text. 
221. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.  
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that date, Lehman’s stock price closed at $24.20.222 A shareholder selling then would 
therefore still have recovered more than twenty-five percent of the initial cost if the 
investor had bought at Lehman’s peak 2007–2008 price.223 
B. How To Test Whether the Disclosures, Overall, Warned of a Possible Liquidity  
 Death 
With the two test periods defined, the first question is whether Lehman’s 
disclosures—considered overall and without regard to details—suggested a significant 
probability that owners of Lehman’s common stock might be wiped out by a liquidity-
caused bankruptcy. Importantly, the question is not whether the disclosures portended 
hard times in which Lehman’s stock price would decline, but whether the disclosures 
suggested a substantial risk of a liquidity heart attack. Did they warn of death, not just 
illness? 
The market price of Lehman stock cannot guide this investigation. It does not 
reveal whether investors were warned of a significant probability of the company’s 
demise. Expected value theory teaches that the rational investor will consider the sum 
of expected probabilities multiplied by possible returns, plus the profit that the investor 
requires.224 Thus, even if a shareholder (or purchaser) at a given time saw a significant 
chance that Lehman might collapse, the investor might still have continued to hold the 
stock (or buy it) if the investor also saw a significant probability that Lehman would 
overcome its problems, with the price of its stock surging as a result. 
For example, an owner of Lehman stock on June 20, 2008, who planned to sell in 
September (or a buyer purchasing the stock on June 20 who planned to sell in 
September) might have been satisfied to hold (or buy) Lehman stock at the $24.20 per 
share for which the stock sold on that date if the investor concluded that there was a 
50% chance that Lehman would die from want of cash by September 20, but also a 
50% chance that Lehman would resolve its business difficulties by that time, with its 
stock price reaching $58. That investor would have computed the expected value of the 
stock in September as 
(.5 x $0) + (.5 x $58) = $29. 
With the expected value at $29, and the price at $24.20, this first investor might well 
have held Lehman stock (or bought it), even if the investor required a 50% annual 
return for doing so, taking into account the extreme volatility of possible outcomes.225 
 
222.  S&P CAPITAL IQ DATABASE, supra note 3.  
223. A twenty-five percent recovery, of course, means a seventy-five percent loss, which is quite large. 
But the question here is not whether warnings could have prevented any loss, or even a large loss. The 
question is whether warnings could have enabled an investor who did not want to take the risk of a liquidity 
disaster a chance to save some significant portion of its investment. Somewhat arbitrarily, this Article sets that 
portion at twenty-five percent for an investor who bought at Lehman’s top price.  
224. KLEIN ET AL., supra note 80, at 242–43.  
225. See BARUCH FISCHHOFF & JOHN KADVANY, RISK: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 69 (2011) 
(explaining that “large losses hurt so much that they have disproportionate (negative) utility”); KLEIN ET AL., 
supra note 80, at 246–50 (explaining premium for volatility risk). Since the three months from June 20 to 
September 20 is one-fourth of a year, a 50% annual return translates to 12.5% over the three months. Twelve 
and a half percent of $24.20 is $3.025. That amount, added to the $24.20, equals $27.225, which is less than 
the $29.00 expected value.  
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A second investor might have concluded, on June 20, that there was a 50% chance 
that Lehman would still be in business September 20 with its stock trading at $10 per 
share, a 50% chance that Lehman would rebound by that time, with its stock up to $48, 
and a 0% chance that Lehman would go bust for lack of cash and credit. This second 
investor would also have concluded that the stock had an expected value of $29, 
computed as 
(.5 x $10) + (.5 x $48) + (0 x $0) = $29. 
Assuming that it also required a 50% annual return,226 this second investor, like the 
first, might well have decided on June 20 to continue to hold Lehman stock at the then-
current price of $24.20 (or buy it at that price) because the second investor, like the 
first, computed the expected value to exceed the price plus required profit. 
It is possible that the market settled on the $24.20 per share price on June 20 even 
though, like the first investor, buyers and holders saw a significant probability that 
Lehman would suffer a cash-deprived cardiac arrest—offset by a similar probability of 
a large gain. But it is possible that the market settled on that price because, like the 
second investor, buyers and holders foresaw a probability of some decline in the 
company’s fortunes—offset by a probability of a large but not jackpot gain—and did 
not see any real chance that the firm would run out of cash. Most likely, investors were 
mixed—some like the first investor, some like the second, and others with myriad 
differing computations involving possible price declines, possible price increases, and 
probabilities associated with each. But the stock price does not reveal what proportion 
of investors fell into each such category and therefore does not reveal what proportion 
of equity investors saw a significant probability that Lehman would suffer a fatal 
liquidity collapse. 
With the stock price unhelpful, this Article looks elsewhere to discover whether 
the information Lehman provided warned its shareholders that their investment might 
be completely destroyed by catastrophic illiquidity.227 Specifically, this Article turns to 
three sources: stock analysts, credit rating agencies, and the buyers and sellers of credit 
default swaps (CDSs). Stock analysts and credit rating agencies provided written 
evaluations of Lehman’s prospects.228 What they wrote directly shows whether the 
 
226. Since the volatility is lower in this second example, the second investor would likely have been 
satisfied with a lower return. 
227. Eventually, stock price information warned of a collapse. Using a very different methodology than 
employed in this Article and focusing on bid-ask spreads, two researchers in a recent draft “identify evidence 
of market speculation about an imminent failure of Lehman Brothers only in the last week of trading.” Thomas 
Gehrig & Marlene Haas, Lehman Brothers: Did Markets Know? 39 (June 2014), available at 
http://www.ecgi.org/wp/wp_id.php?id=681 (emphasis added). But the question this Article examines is 
whether the market recognized a significant risk of a collapse in time for investors to exit with a substantial 
portion of their investment.  
228. See, e.g., Mike Mayo & Matt Fischer, Lehman Brothers Holding: 2Q08 EPS in Line with           
Pre-Release; Exposures Clearer, DEUTSCHE BANK GLOBAL MKTS. RES. (Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc., New York, 
N.Y.), June 16, 2008, at 1, 3 [hereinafter Mayo & Fischer, 2Q08 EPS] (providing valuation and assessment of 
risks); Douglas Sipkin et al., Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.: Tough Year Ahead—Sowing Seeds for Share 
Gains, WACHOVIA EQUITY RES. (Wachovia Capital Mkts., LLC, New York, N.Y.), Jan. 15, 2008, at 1 
[hereinafter Sipkin et al., LEH: Tough Year Ahead] (opining that “the stock will trade in a range of $71–72 per 
share based on a multiple of 1.8x estimated Q1 2008 book value” and that “[r]isks to this valuation range 
include a material decline in primary and secondary debt markets and decreased penetration in European 
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analysts or rating agencies foresaw a serious chance of Lehman’s liquidity death. Those 
who bought and sold CDSs—protection against Lehman defaulting on its own debt—
would win or lose based solely on whether Lehman ran out of cash. Therefore—albeit 
indirectly and only in a crude way—the prices the CDS buyers and sellers paid or 
demanded reflected their expectation that Lehman’s cash and credit would evaporate. 
If analysis discloses that the information from Lehman’s securities filings 
suggested to these other market participants that Lehman ran a significant risk of 
liquidity failure, it is fair to infer that the investors in Lehman’s common stock saw the 
risk in the same light.229 This test is critical because, if shareholders were adequately 
and timely warned of liquidity failure, it may not matter what language Lehman used. 
If the warning succeeded, it may not be particularly important to break down the 
content of Lehman’s disclosures to find key parts and then analyze those parts closely. 
C. The Failure of the Disclosures, Overall, To Provide a Warning 
Turn, then, to the two test periods. In each period, this Part examines what the 
stock analysts and credit rating agencies said about Lehman. In each period, it also 
examines CDS prices. 
1. January 2008 
Stock analysts. Stock analysts collect information about the companies they cover, 
issue reports that project those companies’ financial performance, forecast the 
companies’ stock price performance against market benchmarks, and recommend that 
investors buy, sell, or hold that stock.230 Analysts whose work was readily available 
and who covered Lehman throughout 2008 included those at Credit Suisse Equity 
Research (Credit Suisse), Deutsche Bank Global Markets Research (Deutsche), 
Oppenheimer & Co. Inc. (Oppenheimer), and Wachovia Capital Markets LLC 
(Wachovia). 
Credit Suisse analysts projected in January 2008 that Lehman would 
“Outperform” the market, meaning that the return on Lehman’s stock would exceed the 
average in its industry over the next twelve months.231 Just after this first period ended, 
 
markets”).  
229. Each of the three indicators has flaws. Equity analysts are often overoptimistic. See Khushbu 
Agrawal, Conceptual Framework of Behavioral Biases in Finance, 9 IUP J. BEHAVIORAL FIN. 7, 10 (2012) 
(citing studies of analyst overoptimism). But see Armen Hovakimian & Ekkachai Saenyasiri, Conflicts of 
Interest and Analyst Behavior: Evidence from Recent Changes in Regulation, 66 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 96, 101 
tbl.2 (2010) (showing virtually zero median bias in estimated annual earnings of covered companies in a large 
sample during 2003–06). Credit rating agencies received a public flogging in the wake of the credit crisis for 
their poor performance in rating mortgage-backed securities and derivatives based upon such securities. FCIC 
REPORT, supra note 10, at xxv, 118–22, 146–50, 165, 206–12, 221–24, 242–43. CDS prices may be poor 
predictors of default caused by realization of systemic risk. 
 But the point is not whether any of these indicators were right. Indeed, events proved they were not. The 
point is that these indicators provide insight into the risk predictions of Lehman shareholders, which were also 
wrong. 
230. See Regulation Analyst Certification, Securities Act Release No. 33-8,119, Exchange Act Release 
No. 46,301, 67 Fed. Reg. 51,510 (Aug. 8, 2002).  
231. See Susan Roth Katzke & Ross Seiden, Lehman Brothers: Credit Suisse Financial Services Forum 
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these analysts commented that Lehman was “one of the few” financial firms that had 
“maneuvered through this difficult operating environment” “prudently” and “thereby 
differentiated itself in terms of risk management.”232 Deutsche analysts advised 
investors to “Buy” Lehman stock and said that Lehman’s “culture showed that risk 
management is effective.”233 Oppenheimer analysts rated Lehman an “Outperform” 
stock that would beat the S&P 500 index over the following twelve to eighteen months 
but did include a boilerplate caution that “[a]n extended interruption in liquidity 
[would] have a materially adverse impact on earnings.”234 Wachovia analysts 
forecasted that Lehman would “Outperform” by yielding overmarket returns during the 
next twelve months and said that Lehman was “focused on . . . liquidity.”235 
Thus, most of these stock analysts predicted that Lehman stock would do better 
than other stocks over the year 2008. Two sets of analysts complimented Lehman’s risk 
management. While one set of analysts cautioned in a general way that there was some 
risk that a liquidity interruption could hurt earnings, neither that report nor any of the 
others told investors that Lehman ran a serious risk of descending into a liquidity death 
spiral ending in bankruptcy. 
Credit rating agencies. Credit rating agencies expressly evaluate whether a 
company will have the cash to pay its bills. There were three principal rating agencies 
in 2008: Standard & Poor’s (S&P), Moody’s, and Fitch.236 In January 2008, S&P rated 
Lehman’s long-term debt A+,237 with the “A” meaning that S&P considered Lehman’s 
“capacity to meet [its] financial commitment[s]” on its long-term debt “strong”238 and 
the plus sign meaning that Lehman’s debt-paying capacity was better than that of most 
companies within the “A” category.239 Moody’s rated Lehman’s long-term debt A1,240 
with the “A” signifying “low credit risk” and the “1” putting Lehman’s debt in “the 
higher end” of the A-rated group.241 Fitch rated Lehman’s long-term debt AA-,242 
which (using Fitch's published ratings distribution a year before) put Lehman in the top 
 
Highlights, CREDIT SUISSE EQUITY RES. (Credit Suisse USA, New York, N.Y.), Feb. 7, 2008, at 1, 3 
(explaining an “outperform” rating and showing that Credit Suisse gave Lehman an “outperform” from 
October 8, 2007, through the date of report).  
232. Id. at 1.  
233. Mike Mayo & Matthew Fischer, Lehman Brothers Holding: Meeting with CFO, DEUTSCHE BANK 
GLOBAL MKTS. RES. (Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc., New York, N.Y.), Jan. 10, 2008, at 1–2 [hereinafter Mayo & 
Fischer, Meeting with CFO].  
234. Meredith Whitney & Kaimon Chung, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.: Take-Aways from Meeting 
with LEH’s New CFO Erin Callan, OPPENHEIMER CO. UPDATE (Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., New York, N.Y.), 
Jan. 28, 2008, at 1, 4, 8. 
235. Sipkin et al., LEH: Tough Year Ahead, supra note 228, at 1, 4.  
236. KOLB, supra note 7, at 32.  
237. Lehman 2007 10-K, supra note 4, at 61.  
238. STANDARD & POOR’S, CORPORATE RATINGS CRITERIA 11 (2008) [hereinafter S&P RATINGS 
CRITERIA]. A table providing default rate histories over the period 1981–2006 showed that the debt rated “A” 
defaulted at only a 0.1% rate in the first year following the rating. Id. at 14. 
239. Id. at 12. 
240. Lehman 2007 10-K, supra note 4, at 61.  
241. MOODY’S INVESTOR SERV., MOODY’S RATING SYMBOLS AND DEFINITIONS 8 (2008).  
242. Lehman 2007 10-K, supra note 4, at 61. 
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eighty percent of all companies rated.243 None of these ratings suggested any 
significant probability of a liquidity heart attack and subsequent bankruptcy. 
CDS prices. The holders of Lehman debt, like the holders of debt issued by other 
companies, could buy CDS protection, which would repay their loss if Lehman 
defaulted on its debt. The prices charged for that protection provide the third check on 
the expectation that Lehman might completely collapse. The price of CDS protection 
does not convert directly into an implied probability of default.244 Benchmark CDS 
prices are therefore necessary. As a standard for a CDS price indicating an extreme 
danger of imminent default, this Article uses $724,200—the price to protect against 
Bear’s default on $10 million of its senior debt, if the protection was purchased on 
March 14, 2008, which was effectively Bear’s last day as an independent company.245 
On the other end of the spectrum, Exxon Mobil enjoyed a triple-A credit rating 
throughout 2008246 and operated at far remove from the turmoil swirling through the 
financial firms.247 CDS protection against an Exxon Mobil default averaged $35,040 
throughout 2008,248 and this Article uses that figure as the benchmark price for CDS 
protection against default by a company displaying extreme credit safety. 
 
 
243. Credit ratings “express creditworthiness in terms of relative measures of default likelihood.” FITCH 
RATINGS, INSIDE THE RATINGS: WHAT CREDIT RATINGS MEAN 2 (2007) [hereinafter FITCH, INSIDE THE 
RATINGS]; see also id. at 13 (showing a graph of the distribution of corporate finance issuer ratings as of June 
30, 2007). 
244. CDS prices depend not only on the probability of default but also on anticipated recovery after a 
default and liquidity and regulatory considerations. NOMURA FIXED INCOME RESEARCH, CREDIT DEFAULT 
SWAP (CDS) PRIMER 4 (2004). The factors other than probability of default can complicate extraction of that 
probability from the price. Moreover, the price of a CDS may emerge from such thin trading that it does not 
represent a market judgment. Carrick Mollenkamp & Serena Ng, A Fear Gauge Comes Up Short—Analysis 
Shows Credit-Default swaps, a Popular Indicator of Market Health, Are Thinly Traded, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 
2011, at C1.  
245. All CDS prices are taken from Credit Market Analysis data downloaded from S&P’s Capital IQ and 
on file with the author and Temple Law Review  [hereinafter CMA CDS DATABASE]. Each CDS price used in 
this Article is the annual cost, in each of five years, for protection during those years against loss from the 
issuer’s default on $10,000,000 par value of the issuer’s senior debt. See Michael Simkovic & Benjamin S. 
Kaminetzky, Leveraged Buyout Bankruptcies, the Problem of Hindsight Bias, and the Credit Default Swap 
Solution, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 118, 202–203 (2011) (describing the five-year CDS contract and the 
Credit Market Analysis database).   
 The price for such protection on the last day of Bear’s independent existence (Friday, March 14, 2008) 
should reflect the price for extreme distress because, by that date, Bear’s condition had already prompted “an 
unusual number of customers [to] withdr[a]w funds . . . and a significant number of counterparties and lenders 
[to be] unwilling to make secured funding available to Bear Stearns on customary terms.” Bear Proxy 
Statement, supra note 10, at 27. Moreover, all three credit rating agencies had downgraded Bear debt, while 
also stating that they were considering further downgrades. Id. at 28; see also PAULSON, supra note 14, at 91 
(reporting Paulson’s belief that the Bear CDS price during the firm’s last week reflected the “intense pressure” 
under which Bear labored).  
246. See Exxon Mobil, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 49 (Feb. 27, 2009) [hereinafter Exxon 2008 10-
K]; Exxon Mobil, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 40 (Feb. 20, 2008). 
247. See Exxon 2008 10-K, supra note 246, at 1 (describing Exxon Mobil’s business as “energy, 
involving exploration for, and production of, crude oil and natural gas, manufacture of petroleum products and 
transportation and sale of crude oil, natural gas and petroleum products” rather than banking or finance). 
248. CMA CDS DATABASE, supra note 245. 
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The price for a five-year CDS on $10 million of Lehman debt during January 
2008 varied between $119,000 and $185,800, ending at $145,500—at all times less 
than twenty-six percent of the extreme distress benchmark,249 but at the same time 
about four times the benchmark for extreme safety. This suggests that, while those 
market participants who were putting their money behind their default predictions 
certainly saw some probability of a Lehman meltdown over a five-year horizon, they 
did not see a high probability of a short-term liquidity collapse. 
2. March 10 to June 20, 2008 
Stock analysts. During the second test period, the Credit Suisse stock analysts 
continued to opine that Lehman stock would “Outperform” its industry’s average—
until Lehman announced its second-quarter results (showing a loss and a write-down), 
whereupon these analysts downgraded Lehman to “Neutral,” meaning that they 
expected its stock to provide a total return within ten percent of the industry average 
over the next twelve months.250 The Deutsche analysts said, immediately after Bear’s 
crisis, that “Lehman is Not Bear.”251 They continued to rate Lehman a stock to “Buy” 
through the end of this second period,252 and in June opined that “‘[l]iquidity is not a 
major issue,”253 lauding the increase in Lehman’s “liquidity pool” from $34 billion to 
$45 billion during the second quarter.254 Oppenheimer analysts declared, following 
Bear’s collapse, that Lehman’s first-quarter numbers “dispelled all doubts of a solvency 
crisis at the company.”255 But they reduced their Lehman stock rating from 
“Outperform” to “Perform” and maintained that rating into June, also noting favorably 
in June the increase in Lehman’s “liquidity pool” and further observing in June that 
Lehman had “tested” the new PDCF liquidity backup but “did not have an outstanding 
balance [with that backstop] as-of the end 2Q08.”256 The “Perform” rating meant that 
the Oppenheimer analysts believed Lehman stock would “perform in line with the S&P 
 
249. Id. CDS price comparisons suffer from the implicit assumption that the percentage recovered by 
debt holders after default will be the same at each company. Due to the inaccuracy of that assumption, and for 
other reasons, this Article uses CDS prices for only a very crude comparison of creditworthiness of different 
companies. 
250. See Susan Roth Katzke & Ross Seiden, Lehman Brothers: Recalibrating Expectations, CREDIT 
SUISSE EQUITY RES. (Credit Suisse USA, New York, N.Y.), June 10, 2008, at 1 (new rating), 7 (providing a 
history of Lehman ratings and explaining “neutral”).  
251. Mike Mayo & Matthew Fischer, Lehman Brothers Holding: It Is Not Bear, DEUTSCHE BANK 
GLOBAL MKTS. RES. (Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc., New York, N.Y.), Mar. 17, 2008, at 1.  
252. Mayo & Fischer, 2Q08 EPS, supra note 228, at 1.  
253. Mike Mayo & Matthew Fischer, Lehman Brothers Holding: Lowering Estimates, DEUTSCHE BANK 
GLOBAL MKTS. RES. (Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc., New York, N.Y.), June 5, 2008, at 1. 
254. Mike Mayo & Matthew Fischer, Lehman Brothers Holding: 2Q08 Loss, First Take, DEUTSCHE 
BANK GLOBAL MKTS. RES. (Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc., New York, N.Y.), June 9, 2008, at 1, 2. 
255. Meredith Whitney & Kaimon Chung, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.: LEH Dispels Negative 
Speculation with 1Q08 Earnings, OPPENHEIMER Q. UPDATE (Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., New York, N.Y.), 
Mar. 18, 2008, at 1. 
256. Meredith Whitney et al., Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.: LEH 2Q08 Net Results Match Pre-
Announcement, OPPENHEIMER EQUITY RES. Q. UPDATE (Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., New York, N.Y.), June 17, 
2008, at 22 [hereinafter Whitney et al., LEH 2Q08 Net Results] (showing a chart of rating history, with a 
change to “Perform” on March 24); id. at 1, 4 (quotation and observation that liquidity pool increased).  
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500 within the next 12–18 months.”257 Wachovia analysts rated Lehman “Outperform” 
until the company released second-quarter results, when they downgraded Lehman to 
“Market Perform,” meaning that investors owning Lehman stock should hold it 
because the total return from that stock over the next twelve months “will be in line 
with the market.”258 On June 16, these analysts said that Lehman’s “improved . . . 
liquidity position should go a long way to calming market fears.”259 
Read together, the stock analyst reports recognized that Lehman was experiencing 
trouble by June 20, 2008, with most of the analysts reducing their ratings for Lehman 
stock. But even these analysts predicted that Lehman stock would perform in line with 
the market. None of the reports suggested any serious probability that Lehman would 
follow Bear into a liquidity emergency. To the contrary, the reports suggested that 
Lehman’s liquidity was improving. 
Credit rating agencies. Turning to the credit rating agencies, S&P kept Lehman’s 
credit rating at A+ until June 2008, when it lowered the rating to A, with a negative 
outlook.260 While S&P commented that the rating might decline further if Lehman 
suffered “substantial losses” or if “the firm’s ability to sustain potential liquidity 
stresses should weaken,”261 the A rating reflected S&P’s judgment that Lehman’s 
“capacity to meet its financial commitment[s]” on its long-term debt remained 
“strong,” and the negative outlook did not necessarily mean that the rating would fall 
further.262 Moody’s reaffirmed and maintained its A1 rating on Lehman (low credit 
risk) throughout the second time period but announced a negative outlook on that rating 
after Lehman published its second-quarter financial numbers.263 Moody’s added during 
Bear’s crisis that “Lehman has consistently been among the top financial institutions at 
 
257. Id. at 23. 
258. See Douglas Sipkin et al., Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc.: LEH Hosts Earnings Call—Long-Term 
Story Still Intact, WACHOVIA EQUITY RES. (Wachovia Capital Mkts., LLC, New York, N.Y.), June 16, 2008, at 
1, 5 [hereinafter Sipkin et al., LEH Hosts Earnings Call] (showing rating still at “market perform”); Douglas 
Sipkin et al., Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc.: LEH Pre-Announces, Too Many Inconsistencies—Downgrading 
Rating, WACHOVIA EQUITY RES. (Wachovia Capital Mkts., LLC, New York, N.Y.), June 10, 2008, at 1, 6 
(downgrading Lehman to “market perform” and explaining that rating); Douglas Sipkin et al., Lehman 
Brothers Holdings, Inc.: Lehman Defies Between Skeptics…Again, WACHOVIA EQUITY RES. (Wachovia 
Capital Mkts., LLC, New York, N.Y.), Mar. 19, 2008, at 1 (showing “outperform” rating after Bear).  
259. Sipkin et al., LEH Hosts Earnings Call, supra note 258, at 1.  
260. Diane Hinton et al., Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. Rating Lowered to “A” from “A+”; Outlook 
Negative, STANDARD & POOR’S RATINGSDIRECT (Standard & Poor’s, New York, N.Y.), June 2, 2008, at 2. 
261. Id. at 3. 
262. S&P RATINGS CRITERIA, supra note 238, at 11, 15 (explaining that a negative outlook does not 
necessarily precede a rating change but does mean that the rating “may be lowered”). S&P commented that 
Lehman’s outlook “could be revised to stable if [its] operating performance rebounds to more normal levels.” 
Hinton et al., supra note 260, at 3.  
263. Blaine A. Frantz & Robert Young, Moody’s Affirms Lehman’s A1 Rating; Outlook Now Stable, 
MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE (Moody’s Investors Serv., Inc., New York, N.Y.), Mar. 17, 2008, at 1 
[hereinafter Frantz & Young, Moody’s Affirms Lehman’s A1 Rating]; Blaine A. Frantz & Robert Young, 
Moody’s Changes Lehman’s Rating Outlook to Negative, MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE (Moody’s Investors 
Serv., Inc., New York, N.Y.), June 9, 2008, at 1 [hereinafter Frantz & Young, Moody’s Changes Lehman’s 
Rating]; Blaine A. Frantz & Robert Young, Moody’s Places Lehman’s A1 Rating on Review for Downgrade: 
Prime-1 Affirmed, MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE (Moody’s Investors Serv., Inc., New York, N.Y.), June 13, 
2008, at 1 [hereinafter Frantz & Young, Moody’s Places Lehman’s A1 Rating on Review].  
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managing risk, including market, credit and liquidity risks,”264 and Moody’s stated 
repeatedly during this second period—including at the end—that Lehman’s standalone 
liquidity position “remain[ed] robust,” commenting as well that the PDCF backstop 
helped dispel liquidity doubts.265 After reaffirming its AA- rating on Lehman’s long-
term debt in April, but at the same time revising the ratings outlook to negative,266 
Fitch reduced that rating after Lehman announced second-quarter results in June—
dropping Lehman from AA- to A+ (and keeping a negative outlook), which still left 
Lehman (by Fitch’s published distribution a year before) in the top fifty percent of 
companies Fitch rated.267 Even as it took these steps, Fitch commented in April that it 
believed “Lehman has managed its liquidity particularly well in the last eight months” 
and that Lehman’s “[l]iquidity remains strong.”268 Fitch added in June that “Lehman’s 
liquidity position solidly covers its short-term needs and was recently bolstered by the 
introduction of the [PDCF].”269 
Like the stock analysts, the credit rating agencies therefore reacted to Lehman’s 
declining financial results with downgrades in the second period. But the agencies still 
rated Lehman as a low-risk debtor. One agency called Lehman’s liquidity “robust” and 
another called Lehman’s liquidity “solid[].”270 Two concluded that the new PDCF 
reduced liquidity concerns. Nothing in the revised ratings or the accompanying 
explanations suggested a substantial probability that Lehman’s access to cash would 
dry up and that the company would go to the graveyard as a result. 
CDS prices. Market participants risking their money by buying or selling CDS 
protection against a Lehman default again took a more cautious view. The cost of CDS 
protection on Lehman debt rose to $459,600 on March 14, 2008, just as Bear was 
apparently going down for the count.271 But by the end of the following week, the price 
dropped back to $262,500.272 After then rising to a high of $295,000 on March 28, the 
CDS price fell again and ended on June 20 at $254,500.273 
 
264. Frantz & Young, Moody’s Affirms Lehman’s A1 Rating, supra note 263, at 1.  
265. See id. (noting that “Lehman’s liquidity management and position remain robust”); Frantz & 
Young, Moody’s Changes Lehman’s Rating, supra note 263, at 1 (stating that the “supportive actions of the 
Federal Reserve, including the temporary introduction of the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (‘PDCF’) . . . have 
played a critical role in helping to stabilize funding markets in the wake of the Bear Stearns collapse.”); Frantz 
& Young, Moody’s Places Lehman’s A1 Rating on Review, supra note 263, at 1 (referring to the PDCF and 
Lehman’s $45 billion liquidity pool and repeating that “Lehman’s liquidity management and stand-alone 
liquidity position remain robust”). 
266. Press Release, Fitch Ratings, Fitch Revises Outlook on Lehman Brothers to Negative: Affirms 
‘AA-/F1+’ IDRs (Apr. 1, 2008) (on file with author) [hereinafter Fitch April Press Release].  
267. Press Release, Fitch Ratings, Fitch Downgrades Lehman Brothers’ L-T & S-T IDRs to “A+/F1”; 
Outlook Negative (June 9, 2008) (on file with author)  [hereinafter Fitch June Press Release]; FITCH, INSIDE 
THE RATINGS, supra note 243, at 13 (graph showing distribution of corporate finance issuer ratings as of June 
30, 2007). 
268. Fitch April Press Release, supra note 266, at 1. 
269. Fitch June Press Release, supra note 267. 
270. Frantz & Young, Moody’s Affirms Lehman’s A1 Rating, supra note 263, at 1; Fitch June Press 
Release, supra note 267. 
271. CMA CDS DATABASE, supra note 245. 
272. Id.  
273. Id.  
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Thus, during the second test period, CDS buyers and sellers again saw some 
probability of a Lehman default, with the CDS price well above the $35,040 extreme 
credit safety benchmark. Indeed, CDS protection against a Lehman default cost more 
than seven times the benchmark price for a company displaying extreme credit safety. 
But the prices for a five-year CDS on Lehman’s debt during and at the end of the 
second period were still far below the $724,200 extreme distress benchmark (ending at 
only thirty-five percent of that extreme distress figure), so the pricing did not suggest 
an extremely high risk of a liquidity demise at any time during the next five years. 
Moreover the CDS prices came down between Bear’s demise and the end of the second 
period, indicating that—as Lehman’s death came closer—those pricing protection 
against it saw that death as less probable. 
In sum, the stock analysts and credit rating professionals, who provided their 
evaluations in writing, did not see—in either test period—any serious probability that 
Lehman would fall victim to a liquidity heart attack. The buyers and sellers of CDS 
protection against a Lehman default did see a risk, but they saw that risk declining as 
the second period drew to a close, and they never saw the risk as extreme. Assuming 
that the holders of Lehman common stock analyzed the information Lehman disclosed 
in roughly the same manner as did these other participants in the financial world, those 
shareholders, too, included some who interpreted the disclosed information to portend 
some risk of Lehman running out of cash, some who did not, and even among those 
who did see a real risk, many who concluded that the risk declined after Bear’s distress. 
Tested as a whole, then, Lehman’s disclosures failed to provide widespread warning 
that the firm ran a very significant risk of liquidity death in the short run.274 The market 
did not, from the Lehman’s disclosures, predict a heart attack. 
D.  The Failure of the Disclosures To Warn of Triparty Repo Risks 
Having determined that Lehman’s disclosures did not—considering their effect 
rather than their content—warn of liquidity death, this Part turns to content. 
Specifically, it asks whether the disclosures relating to triparty repo transactions 
revealed the risks that the repos posed. 
1.  January 2008 
In January 2008, Lehman filed its 10-K for the fiscal year 2007.275 The word 
“triparty” did not appear anywhere in that filing.276 While the 10-K included a number 
for “Securities sold under agreement to repurchase” ($181.732 billion at the end of 
fiscal 2007),277 that number did not match the number that Lehman provided months 
 
274. This does not mean that the disclosures violated the securities laws. It means only that the 
disclosures did not produce a consensus in the investment community that Lehman faced extreme liquidity 
risk.  
275. Lehman 2007 10-K, supra note 4, at 1. 
276. Nor were triparty repos mentioned in the conference call on the last quarter of 2007, which 
preceded the first time period. Lehman Bros., Inc., Conference Call: Fourth Quarter Earnings (Dec. 13, 2007) 
(transcript on file with author).  
277. Lehman 2007 10-K, supra note 4, at 87.  
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later for the 2007 year-end triparty repos ($230 billion).278 So investors could not even 
see the amount of triparty repo financing. 
Since the 10-K did not even refer to triparty repos, it did not describe their 
structure. In particular, Lehman did not describe the morning unwind and the extension 
by JPM of billions of dollars in credit to substitute during the day for lender financing 
overnight. The 10-K gave no hint that JPM unwound and extended intraday credit at its 
sole discretion, or that JPM could—by threatening not to unwind—effectively demand 
haircuts and a collateral cushion that would reduce the cash at Lehman’s disposal.279  
Similarly, the 10-K did not describe the triparty repo lenders. It did not suggest 
that those lenders, in the face of some combination of bad news about Lehman, might 
simply refuse to loan to Lehman at all instead of adjusting terms to account for the 
increased default risk that the bad news implied. Lehman thus gave no hint that any 
significant number of its lenders might be information insensitive until shock. 
The 10-K did state that Lehman’s Capital Markets operations included an “equity 
and fixed income matched book,”280 and described that business as one in which 
Lehman sought to make “profits from the difference between interest earned and 
interest paid.”281 The 10-K further stated that the matched book “typically” involved 
high-quality collateral—“government or government agency securities.”282 But the 
filing said nothing about the possibility that a lender pullback might leave Lehman 
without lending from the triparty market to finance the matched loans in the bilateral 
market, even when the matched transactions rested on government securities. 
All of this does not mean that Lehman ignored liquidity risk. To the contrary, 
Lehman’s 10-K defined “liquidity” as “ready access to funds”283 and “liquidity risk” as 
“the potential that we are unable to: [m]eet our payment obligations when due; 
[b]orrow funds in the market on an on-going basis and at an acceptable price to fund 
actual or proposed commitments; or [l]iquidate assets in a timely manner at a 
reasonable price.”284 The filing expressly listed “Liquidity Risk” among the company’s 
“Risk Factors.”285 As partial protection against that risk, Lehman said that it maintained 
a “liquidity pool” that was sized to “cover[] expected cash outflows for twelve months 
in a stressed liquidity environment.”286 That pool consisted of assets that the company 
 
278. Lehman 2Q 10-Q, supra note 23, at 84. 
279. JPM’s securities filings did not fill this gap, as they, too, did not mention triparty repos or describe 
the morning unwind or the related intraday loan. JPMorgan Chase & Co., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Aug. 
11, 2008); JPMorgan Chase & Co., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (May 12, 2008); JPMorgan Chase & Co., 
Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 29, 2008).  
280. Lehman 2007 10-K, supra note 4, at 4, 6.  
281. Id. at 6. 
282. Id. 
283. Id. at 17. 
284. Id. at 75. 
285. Id. at 17; see also id. at 37 (“While our liquidity strategy seeks to ensure that we maintain sufficient 
liquidity to meet all of our funding obligations in all markets, our liquidity could be impaired by an inability to 
access secured and/or unsecured debt markets, an inability to access funds from our subsidiaries, an inability to 
sell assets or unforeseen outflows of cash or collateral.”).  
286. Id. at 56. 
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could quickly convert to cash.287 Lehman reported the pool to total $35 billion at the 
end of fiscal 2007.288 
Carefully read, however, the 10-K suggested that the liquidity pool was never 
intended to substitute for repo financing—whether triparty or otherwise. True, Lehman 
said that the pool would cover not only the “repayment of . . . unsecured debt” but also 
“[t]he anticipated impact of adverse changes on secured funding—either in the form of 
a greater difference between the market and pledge value of assets (also known as 
‘haircuts’) or in the form of reduced borrowing availability.”289 But Lehman also said 
that it managed liquidity risk by “[r]elying on secured funding only to the extent that 
we believe it would be available in all market environments.”290 More explicitly, the 
company stated that “[e]ven within the one-year time frame contemplated by our 
liquidity pool, we depend on continuous access to secured financing in the repurchase . 
. . market[], which could be impaired by factors that are not specific to Lehman 
Brothers, such as a severe disruption of the financial markets.”291 If anything, then, 
Lehman—instead of warning that its clearing bank and lenders might drain the firm’s 
liquidity—at least implied in January 2008 that repo financing was solid and would not 
significantly decline due to Lehman-specific problems. 
2. March 10 to June 20, 2008 
In the second test period, Lehman announced the financial results for the first 
quarter of its 2008 fiscal year, hosted a conference call to discuss those numbers, and 
filed the Form 10-Q for that first quarter.292 Later in this period, Lehman made an early 
announcement of estimated second-quarter financial results, then announced the 
financial results for its second quarter and hosted two conference calls to discuss that 
quarter.293 The second period ends before Lehman filed the related 10-Q.294 
The triparty repo disclosures during this second test period were still quite thin. 
The press release announcing the first-quarter results did not include the word 
“repurchase” at all.295 Like the 10-K in the first time period, the Lehman 10-Q for the 
first quarter included a figure for “Securities sold under agreements to repurchase” but 
did not break out triparty repos.296 The conference call for the first-quarter results 
provided a figure for triparty repos ($115 billion) that was apparently “exclusive of the 
 
287. Id. 
288. Id. 
289. Id.; see also id. at 37 (recognizing that “our liquidity could be impaired by an inability to access 
secured and/or unsecured debt markets”) (emphasis added)).  
290. Id. at 75 (emphasis added). 
291. Id. at 17 (emphasis added). 
292. Lehman 1Q 10-Q, supra note 21; Lehman Press Release Mar. 18, 2008, supra note 21; Lehman 
First Quarter Conference Call, supra note 21. 
293. Lehman Press Release June 9, 2009, supra note 23; Lehman Press Release June 16, 2008, supra 
note 23; June 10 Preliminary Q2 Figures Call, supra note 216; Lehman Second Quarter Conference Call, 
supra note 23.  
294. Lehman 2Q 10-Q, supra note 23. 
295. Lehman Press Release Mar. 18, 2008, supra note 21.  
296. Lehman 1Q 10-Q, supra note 21, at 6. 
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match book,”297 different from the 10-Q’s number for “Securities sold under 
agreements to repurchase” ($197.128 billion),298 and different again from the triparty 
number for the first quarter that Lehman published after the second period ended ($230 
billion).299 So the total amount of triparty repo financing at the end of Lehman’s first 
2008 quarter was virtually impossible to see. 
The press releases announcing the results for the second quarter did not mention 
repurchase agreements.300 In the second conference call about that quarter, the 
company said that it had approximately $188 billion in “[t]otal repo . . . , of which 
matchbook and customer funding is between one third and a half with remainder firm 
inventory” and then provided a figure of $105 billion for triparty repo.301 It was only 
after the second period that the company said that the full $188 billion had been 
triparty.302 Putting aside any rationale for these different numbers,303 the total triparty 
repo number thus remained unclear even at the end of the second period. 
As was true during the first period, none of Lehman’s disclosures during the 
second period included any description of JPM’s role as a clearing bank. In particular, 
Lehman did not describe the morning unwind and intraday loan, the discretionary 
nature of that loan, and the power that the unwind and discretionary loan provided to 
JPM. And nothing addressed the possibility that JPM would use that power to require 
intraday haircuts or a collateral cushion. 
As was true in the first period, Lehman did not disclose in the second period that 
lenders might be information insensitive until shock. But the second-period disclosures 
did recognize that lenders might flee. Thus, while Lehman again referred to its 
“liquidity pool” and again stated that that pool was “sized to cover” a twelve-month 
liquidity squeeze,304 Lehman omitted the qualifier statement that the company assumed 
continuing access to repo financing during such a one-year cash drought. 
Instead, Lehman now suggested that its liquidity pool could cover any lender 
flight. During the conference call discussing final second-quarter results, Lehman 
explicitly broke down triparty repos and stated that—excluding high-quality securities 
(many of which the PDCF would finance) and repos between Lehman subsidiaries—
only $32 billion of triparty repos remained.305 Most of this financing consisted of term 
 
297. See Lehman First Quarter Conference Call, supra note 21, at 10 (Erin Callan, CFO, stating: “Total 
repo exclusive of the match book was $215 billion of which a substantial majority of this collateral is eligible 
to be pledged under the new Fed facility. We have $115 billion of tie [sic] party secured financing which is 
really just the total repo amount less treasuries and agencies which go through the FICC system 
anonymously.”). This transcript contains a typographical error, substituting “tie” for “tri.” See the transcript of 
this call prepared by CCBN, Inc. and FDCH e-Media, Inc. at 12 (on file with author).  
298. Lehman 1Q 10-Q, supra note 21, at 6. 
299. Lehman 2Q 10-Q, supra note 23, at 84.   
300. Lehman Press Release June 9, 2008, supra note 23; Lehman Press Release June 16, 2008, supra 
note 23. 
301. Lehman Second Quarter Conference Call, supra note 23, at 14 (Ian Lowitt, CFO).  
302. Lehman 2Q 10-Q, supra note 23, at 84.  
303. The company may have provided the somewhat confusing numbers quite innocently—simply 
taking out the matched book to advise investors that $105 billion of triparty repo financed those securities that 
Lehman itself owned as inventory or proprietary investments.  
304. Lehman 1Q 10-Q, supra note 21, at 65.  
305. CFO Ian Lowitt said: 
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repos, with an average length of over forty days, and, more importantly, Lehman said 
that “[a]ny loss of repo capacity may be absorbed” by the liquidity pool.306 Lehman 
stated that that pool—which could be turned quickly into cash if necessary—had risen 
to $45 billion.307 
The figures that Lehman provided in the conference call on final second-quarter 
results alerted shareholders to the circumstance that one-third to one-half of the triparty 
deals were matched transactions.308 Since Lehman had disclosed back in January that 
the matched book deals typically involved high-quality government or government 
agency securities,309 the assurance that its liquidity pool would only be needed to 
provide non-repo funding for securities of lesser quality suggested that the matched 
book was insulated from liquidity problems. 
In sum, Lehman disclosed in the second period nothing of the risk that its clearing 
bank might insist on crippling additions to its collateral cushion, and, while Lehman at 
least recognized the risk of a lender pullback, it implied that—with the help of the new 
government liquidity backstop and its liquidity pool—the firm could successfully 
manage that risk. 
E. The Failure of the Disclosures To Warn of Endgame Risks 
As set out in Part I.C.2, Lehman’s endgame failed because Lehman did not—in 
the last few desperate days of its life—merge into a healthier company. While the U.S. 
 
  With respect to our secured funding position, total repo is approximately $188 billion, of which 
match book and customer funding is between one-third and a half, with the remainder firm 
inventory. Of this amount, approximately $83 billion is treasuries and agencies. The remaining $105 
million [sic] is tri-party repo, of which approximately $40 billion consists of central bank eligible 
collateral.  
  Of the remaining $65 billion of repo, $25 billion is in investment grade, fixed income securities 
and major index equities, for which there exists a very active, reliable, and liquid repo market, and a 
further $8 billion of assets are funded within our own banks. The remaining $32 billion of collateral 
is funded largely with term facilities. The average [tenor] of our non-central bank eligible tri-party 
repo is now over 40 days. Any loss of repo capacity may be absorbed within our pools of liquidity 
available to the broker dealers, which represent more than 150% of the remaining repo. 
Additionally, we have over-funded the tri-party repo book by approximately $27 billion. That is, we 
have repo’d out collateral in excess of firm and client positions, filling this by substituting treasuries 
and agencies in the U.S. and borrowing in collateral in Europe. This gives us the ability to absorb 
changes in repo capacity in times of stress by reducing total collateral borrowed in or reallocating 
the higher quality, easy-to-fund collateral outside these facilities as necessary.  
Lehman Second Quarter Conference Call, supra note 23, at 14.  
 The Treasuries, agency debt, central-bank eligible instruments, and investment-grade fixed-income 
securities all appeared to qualify for PDCF lending. Initial PDCF Terms, supra note 165.  Lowitt’s reference 
to liquidity pools available to the broker dealer subsidiaries probably takes into account not only the holding 
company’s then $45 billion pool, Lehman Second Quarter Conference Call, supra note 23, at 14 (Ian Lowitt, 
CFO), but also the separate liquidity pools maintained by those subsidiaries. Lehman 2007 10-K, supra note 4, 
at 57 n.1 to tbl.  
306. Lehman Second Quarter Conference Call, supra note 23, at 14 (Ian Lowitt, CFO).  
307. Id. at 13–14 (Ian Lowitt, CFO).  
308. See supra note 305 and accompanying text. 
309. See supra note 282 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the Lehman 10-K indicated that 
the matched book deals involved high-quality collateral, such as government agency securities. 
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government looked for a merger partner and found BofA, the government would not 
for Lehman (as it had for Bear) put money into the deal to make a BofA deal work. 
And the last-ditch Barclays’ option fell apart because a British regulator, the FSA, 
would not waive the requirement for a shareholder vote to approve a guarantee 
necessary for the Lehman-Barclays deal. This Part turns now to whether Lehman 
disclosed these risks. 
1.  January 2008 
In the 10-K it filed in the first test period, Lehman failed to provide any endgame 
discussion.310 It made no public reference to the risks it would face if forced to seek an 
emergency merger to avoid collapse. It therefore provided no discussion of the chances 
for (and obstacles to) overcoming those risks, consummating a merger, and thereby 
salvaging at least something for the shareholders. 
Lehman did not even identify the government actors that might play an endgame 
role. The 10-K listed regulators that supervised Lehman—including the SEC, the 
NYSE, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.311 Lehman also identified 
foreign regulators, including the FSA, which regulated overseas subsidiaries.312 None 
of that discussion, however, addressed the role that any of these agencies might play in 
arranging an emergency merger to avoid liquidity death. And the 10-K did not mention 
the U.S. Department of the Treasury at all, or the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
in any significant way313—even though both took center stage in last-minute efforts to 
save the firm.314 
2.  March 10 to June 20  
During the second test period, Lehman filed a 10-Q on April 9 that again referred 
to regulators but added nothing to the disclosures in January.315 Like the January 10-K, 
the April 10-Q did not mention Treasury even once and included only passing 
comments on the FSA and the U.S. Federal Reserve.316 Neither of these documents, 
nor the press releases announcing the first- and second-quarter financial results, nor 
related conference calls, included even a word addressing a survival endgame. 
 
310. Lehman did say that it had “developed and regularly update[d] a Funding Action Plan [FAP], which 
represents a detailed action plan to manage a stress liquidity event.” Lehman 2007 10-K, supra note 4, at 60. 
But the FAP was not an endgame strategy for a liquidity crisis during which Lehman might have to sell itself 
rather than fall into bankruptcy. The FAP was instead intended to forestall such an endgame altogether, which 
it did not do. In any event, the FAP does not appear to have played any significant role as Lehman died. The 
Examiner’s Report, which devoted over 100 pages to “Lehman’s Survival Strategies and Efforts,” did not 
mention the FAP even once. Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 609–726. 
311. Lehman 2007 10-K, supra note 4, at 10–11.  
312. Id. at 11, 13–14, 134. 
313. The 10-K mentions the Federal Reserve only twice. See id. at 20 (referring to “the interest rate and 
monetary policies of the Federal Reserve Board”); id. at 35 (discussing Federal Reserve interest rate changes).  
314. See supra notes 189–213 and accompanying text. 
315. Lehman 1Q 10-Q, supra note 21, at 36–37. The 10-Q also again referred to the FAP. Id. at 69.  
316. See id. at 46 (stating that the U.S. Federal Reserve had reduced interest rates and created the 
PDCF); id. at 36 (stating that the FSA regulated Lehman’s European broker-dealer). 
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III.  WHAT TO MAKE OF IT 
The failure of Lehman’s disclosures to alert the market to the risk of a liquidity 
heart attack leads inevitably to the question of whether Lehman realistically could have 
provided timely warning of extreme liquidity risk. This Section addresses that question. 
Part A examines whether, realistically, Lehman could have warned of the extreme risks 
that triparty repos posed to the firm’s liquidity. Part B considers whether, realistically, 
Lehman could have warned of the extreme risks posed by playing out an endgame. 
After both Parts A and B conclude that effective and timely disclosure was not 
possible, Part C draws the analysis together and identifies the factors that put timely 
risk warnings effectively out of reach.  
A.  Frustration of Triparty Repo Risk Disclosure  
Lehman’s disclosures failed to tell shareholders the magnitude of Lehman’s 
triparty repo business, failed to describe triparty repo transactions, failed to warn that 
JPM could use its power from the unwind to extract haircuts and a collateral cushion, 
and failed to caution that lenders might be insensitive to bad news about Lehman until 
that news reached some unpredictable critical mass, whereupon the lenders might 
desert Lehman instead of continuing to lend but tightening terms.317 Consider whether 
Lehman could have provided timely warning that such risks were present and might 
mature. 
1.  January 2008 
It is hard to see how Lehman—in January 2008—could have revealed the facts 
that created the key repo risks. Certainly, Lehman could have given a triparty repo 
number for the end of its fiscal 2007 year, could have revealed the extent to which 
triparty repos provided the liquidity for the matched book, and could have described the 
unwind, which effectively put all triparty repos (even those with multiday terms) at risk 
every twenty-four hours. Those disclosures would have alerted Lehman shareholders to 
the fact that a very significant part of Lehman’s business depended on extremely short-
term financing. With those disclosures, shareholders might have deduced the 
possibility that something could quickly go wrong in a big way on the liquidity front. 
But such general textual warnings would hardly have given shareholders facts by which 
they could have deduced not just the possibility, but a significant probability, that 
triparty repos would lead to a liquidity disaster. 
In January, Lehman simply did not have—and therefore could not have 
disclosed—the specific facts from which shareholders could have deduced such a 
probability. It was not until February that JPM advised Lehman that JPM would require 
any daytime haircuts and not until June that JPM demanded any collateral cushion.318 
Similarly, the repo market had been operating efficiently for years by January 2008,319 
 
317. See supra Part II.D for a discussion of Lehman’s disclosures about triparty repos.  
318. See supra notes 103–17 and accompanying text for a discussion of JPM’s decision to impose 
haircuts and demand a collateral cushion and JPM’s communication of these requirements to Lehman.  
319. See Acharya & Öncü, supra note 33, at 320 (describing how repos had become an attractive 
financing option since regulatory changes in the 1980s).  
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and the financing world did not yet know that some lenders might suddenly react to bad 
news about a dealer by ceasing to lend to that dealer altogether—even against very 
high-quality collateral—effectively acting as if they were making unsecured rather than 
secured loans.320 
Importantly, no securities law or regulation required Lehman to conduct an 
investigation to discover these facts. True, U.S. securities protocols sometimes demand 
(and demanded in 2008) that a public company disclose—in its own filings—
information about other companies. For example, a public company must disclose (and 
was required in 2008 to disclose) the dependence of any segment of its business “upon 
a single customer, or a few customers, the loss of any one or more of which would have 
a material adverse effect on the segment,” and provide the name of any customer the 
sales to which comprise ten percent or more of the company’s consolidated 
revenues.321 And a company must today describe (and in 2008 was required to 
describe) “[c]ompetitive conditions,” including (if the company “knows or has reason 
to know” them) the name(s) of any “one or a small number of competitors” who are 
“dominant” in the company’s industry.322 But these are all objective facts that the filing 
company knows about other companies, or can easily determine. 
Going further, securities regulations require (and required in 2008) a public 
company to disclose the danger that a counterparty will take future action adverse to 
the company when the filing company has facts that clearly show that danger. Thus, 
Item 303 of Regulation S-K mandates (and mandated in 2008) that a company disclose 
“any known trends or uncertainties that have had or that the [company] reasonably 
expects will have a material favorable or unfavorable impact on net sales or revenues or 
income from continuing operations.”323 To comply with Item 303, a company for 
example must warn its stockholders if it (i) “know[s] that a material government 
contract is about to expire[,] . . . [and (ii) is] uncertain as to whether the contract will be 
renewed [because the company (a)] . . . . know[s] that a competitor has found a way to 
provide the same service or product at a price less than that charged by the [company or 
(b)] . . . ha[s] been advised by the government that the contract [might] not be 
 
320. When lenders suddenly pulled back from Bear in March, that swift retrenchment came as a shock. 
See Hearing on “The Shadow Banking System” Before the Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n 78–79 (May 5, 2010) 
(COMMISSIONER HOLTZ-EAKIN: “Another question I’ve just been confused by. Why in the moment, even 
if you had Treasuries as your collateral, were people unwilling to do repo with you? And why didn’t the 
haircuts just adjust to continue to give you access?” WITNESS MOLINARO: “That’s a question that we were 
asking ourselves in that period of time. We were surprised by the way that this was happening.”), available at 
http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-testimony/2010-0505-Transcript.pdf; The Shadow Banking 
System: Hearing Before the Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n 3 (May 5, 2010) (statement of Paul Friedman, former 
chief operating officer of fixed income Bear Stearns) (“During the week of March 10, 2008, Bear Sterns 
suffered from a run on the bank that resulted . . . from an unwarranted loss of confidence in the firm by certain 
of its customers, lenders and counterparties . . . . [which resulted in, among other things,] repo market lenders 
declin[ing] to roll over or renew repo loans, even when the loans were supported by high-quality collateral 
such as agency securities . . . .”), available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-
testimony/2010-0505-Friedman.pdf. See also supra note 149 for a discussion of the overreliance on short-term 
secured funding and its presumed stability in the triparty repo market.  
321. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(1)(vii) (2014); 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(1)(vii) (2008).  
322. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(1)(x) (2014); 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(1)(x) (2008).  
323. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii) (2014); 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii) (2008). 
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renewed.”324 But these obligations are by their terms limited to dangers reasonably 
foreseeable from known facts and do not include an obligation to investigate to find 
facts.325 
None of these regulations obligated Lehman to try to discover JPM’s future 
intentions regarding haircuts or collateral cushions or the as-yet-unrevealed nature of 
lenders who would prove to be information insensitive until shock. Moreover, the 
philosophy behind the limited requirements to disclose information about other 
companies has made courts leery of interpreting disclosure rules in ways that punish a 
first company for failing to report the plans of a second.326 This reluctance reflects a 
recognition that the first company may be unable to accurately discover the intentions 
of the second.327 Put simply, one company cannot read the mind of another. 
That same concern suggests that it would have been a bad idea to have required 
Lehman to speculate as to JPM’s future haircut and collateral cushion demands or 
lenders’ future inclinations—in the face of bad news about Lehman—to decline loans 
altogether rather than to adjust terms to compensate for higher risk. JPM might have 
declined, for business reasons, to suggest to an important customer that new and 
possibly huge liquidity hits were on the way until JPM determined that the steps that 
would hurt Lehman were necessary for JPM’s own protection. Similarly, lenders who 
were regularly renewing overnight repos with Lehman on terms that benefited the 
lenders might have been wary of telling Lehman that they might suddenly and 
unpredictably bail out if publicity about Lehman turned sour. In the face of these 
incentives by counterparties to conceal their plans and intentions that could strangle 
Lehman’s liquidity, it would have been unfair, and most likely fruitless, to have 
imposed on Lehman a requirement that it deduce, and then disclose, what JPM and 
overnight lenders would do.  
 
 
324. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303; Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of 
Operations; Certain Investment Company Disclosures, Securities Act Release No. 33-6,835, Exchange Act 
Release No. 34-26,831, Investment Company Act Release No. 16,961, 54 Fed. Reg. 22,427 (May 24, 1989) 
(emphasis added).  
325. See J & R Mktg. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 549 F.3d 384, 391–92 (6th Cir. 2008) (affirming dismissal 
where the plaintiff alleged that a company should have disclosed in its offering documents that its parent had 
overstated cash flows and otherwise misrepresented its financial condition and results, as well as rejecting 
interpretation of 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(1) to reach matters that are “knowable” and so impose a “duty to first 
investigate and then disclose” and holding that “the duty of disclosure arising from Item 303 require[s] 
knowledge”). 
326. See In re Adams Golf, Inc. Sec. Litig., 381 F.3d 267, 278 (3d Cir. 2004) (affirming dismissal of 
case insofar as plaintiffs alleged that the defendant’s offering documents should have disclosed oversupply at 
retailers of competitors’ golf clubs and stating that “the securities laws obligated Adams Golf to disclose 
material information concerning its own business and not necessarily the details relating to its competitors”).  
327. See In re Stac Elecs. Sec. Litig., 89 F.3d 1399, 1407 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal of a case 
based on the defendant’s failure to include in its offering documents that Microsoft was about to introduce a 
product that would preempt the market and stating that “[w]e agree with Stac that another company’s plans 
cannot be known to a certainty. Even assuming, as we must, that Microsoft had informed Stac that it planned 
to introduce data compression, Stac could not have known whether or not Microsoft would truly do so.”). 
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2. March 10 to June 20, 2008 
During the second test period, as during the first, Lehman could have disclosed 
the amount of its triparty repo financing in straightforward terms, could have described 
the discretionary morning unwind and intraday loan, could have revealed the power 
that the unwind gave to JPM to impose haircuts or require a collateral cushion, and 
could have told its shareholders that such haircuts and such a cushion would erode 
Lehman’s liquidity. Lehman’s failure to do any of that seems strange because—during 
this second period—Lehman knew that JPM would be exercising its power in just this 
way. JPM told Lehman in February (before the second test period began) that it would 
require haircuts equal to those imposed by the overnight lenders,328 and JPM advised 
Lehman in early June (before the second period ended) that it would require a collateral 
cushion.329 
It would be possible to read the securities laws and regulations to have required 
Lehman to disclose at least the haircuts and collateral cushion that JPM demanded 
before and during the second period and the liquidity risks they posed. For example, 
Item 303(a)(1) requires (and required in 2008) that a company identify “any known 
demands . . . that will result in or that are reasonably likely to result in the [company’s] 
liquidity increasing or decreasing in any material way.”330 And Item 503(c) requires 
(and required in 2008) that a public company discuss “the most significant factors that 
make the [company] . . . risky.”331 Lehman’s 10-Q filed on April 9 very arguably 
should have included the JPM haircut demand in order to comply with Items 303(a)(1) 
and 503(c).332 And that disclosure, in order be complete, very arguably should have 
stated that the haircuts would, dollar for dollar, reduce Lehman’s NFE and thereby 
reduce Lehman’s liquidity. 
Moreover, the securities laws generally require (and required in 2008) that, when 
a company makes a statement on a subject, it must include all material facts necessary 
in order to avoid misleading investors by material omission.333 Thus, all the statements 
in the second period relating to liquidity and the adequacy of Lehman’s liquidity pool 
arguably should have included the information that Lehman had—at the time of the 
statements—about JPM’s haircut and collateral cushion requirements. Since JPM had 
advised Lehman of the coming daytime haircuts in February, this rule arguably 
required Lehman to disclose those haircuts in the April 9 10-Q’s liquidity discussion. 
 
328. See supra notes 106–10 and accompanying text.  
329. See supra notes 114–17 and accompanying text. 
330. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(1) (2014); 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(1) (2008).  
331. 17 C.F.R. § 229.503(c) (2014); 17 C.F.R. § 229.503(c) (2008).  
332. Item 303(b) required that Form 10-Q include any “material changes” in financial condition from the 
end of Lehman’s 2007 fiscal year (Nov. 30, 2007) through the end of the first quarter of 2008 (Feb. 28, 2007). 
17 C.F.R. § 229.303(b)(1) (2008); JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. ET AL., FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS: SELECTED 
STATUTES, RULES AND FORMS 1552 (2008). Similarly, Form 10-Q required the 10-Q to “[s]et forth any 
material changes from risk factors . . . in the . . . 10-K.” COFFEE ET AL., supra, at 1553. And Form 10-K 
required Item 503(c) risk factors. Id. at 1562. The Lehman 10-K did not refer to clearing bank collateral 
demands in its risk factors. Lehman 2007 10-K, supra note 4, at 14–22. Lehman’s 10-Q for the first quarter 
stated that there were “no material changes” in the risk factors the 10-K had included. Lehman 1Q 10-Q, supra 
note 21, at 89.  
333. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b), 12b-20 (2014); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b), 12b-20 (2008).  
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The rule that statements must not mislead by material omissions also arguably required 
Lehman—in its discussion of the liquidity pool during the June 16 conference call—to 
state that JPM was requiring daytime haircuts and had advised on June 2 that it 
required billions as a collateral cushion and that these requirements had and would 
reduce Lehman’s NFE and therefore its liquidity.334 Further, Lehman’s emphasis in the 
June 16 conference call on the multiday term for many of its repos very arguably 
misled without adding that JPM unwound—at its discretion—even those multiday 
repos on the morning of every business day so that the structure of triparty repos made 
every one of them vulnerable to breakdown each morning.335 
That said, the JPM demands that killed Lehman came after the second period 
ended on June 20—particularly the $5 billion collateral demand on September 9 and 
the further $5 billion demand on September 11.336 JPM notified Lehman that it needed 
to make those collateral postings only after JPM concluded that the collateral Lehman 
posted beginning on June 19337 was unsatisfactory.338 And JPM did not form its view 
that the collateral was unsatisfactory until late August or early September.339 Lehman 
could not reasonably have been required to foresee this by the end of the second period 
(June 20), particularly since its collateral changed through substitutions after June 
19.340 As set out in Part III.A.1, securities laws and regulations do not require one 
company to guess at the future actions of another company. And requiring disclosure of 
such guesses would have yielded information of very questionable value anyway 
because of JPM’s incentive to preserve its relationship with Lehman by keeping silent 
on future collateral demands until JPM decided to make them. 
In addition, JPM’s September 9 through 11 focus on Lehman collateral was 
almost certainly motivated in significant part by JPM’s knowledge that triparty lenders 
were beginning to pull away from Lehman.341 As Lehman’s clearing bank for triparty 
repos, JPM could see that happening.342 And JPM could appreciate the resulting 
increased risk that, if JPM unwound on September 12 and Lehman could not find 
lenders for the September 12 through 15 weekend, Lehman might default on the 
September 12 intraday loan or, if JPM unwound on Monday, September 15, that 
lenders might not lend for the following night, causing Lehman to default on the 
 
334. See supra notes 108–14 and accompanying text for a discussion of the conversations between JPM 
and Lehman regarding haircuts and collateral before the June 16 conference call and the effect of intraday 
haircuts on Lehman’s NFE, and see Part II.D.2, demonstrating that Lehman did not disclose either the JPM 
haircuts or the demanded collateral cushion during March 10 to June 20, 2008.  
335. See supra notes 305–06 and accompanying text for Lehman’s emphasis during the conference call 
on a forty-day average tenor of repos collateralized by securities not eligible for Central Bank financing, supra 
note 71 and accompanying text demonstrating that even term repos unwound every morning, and supra Part 
II.D.2 demonstrating that Lehman did not disclose the morning unwind during March 10 to June 20, 2008.  
336. See supra notes 124–30 and accompanying text. 
337. See supra notes 115–20 and accompanying text. 
338. See supra notes 121–22 and accompanying text. 
339. See supra notes 121–22 and accompanying text. 
340. See supra note 119 and accompanying text for a discussion of Lehman’s asset substitutions related 
to collateral payments. 
341. See supra Part I.B.2.b for a discussion of lender flight from Lehman. 
342. Zubrow, supra note 109, at 7.  
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September 15 intraday loan.343 Lehman could not have predicted—by June 20—these 
September dynamics and their effect on JPM demands.  
Much the same is true of disclosure about lenders possibly pulling back. Surely, 
after Bear’s crisis, Lehman knew—from press reports and public statements by other 
market participants—that overnight repo lenders could suddenly refuse to lend and 
could do so even when the repos were based on high-quality securities of unquestioned 
value and liquidity.344 Again, securities laws arguably required Lehman to say that 
those who bought or held Lehman stock ran the risk of a similar lender run against 
Lehman.  
But Lehman shareholders, and investors thinking of buying or holding Lehman 
stock during the second period, could see that risk—without any Lehman disclosure—
from the same press reports and public statements that informed Lehman. In the 
technical language of securities law, those already known generalities would not, if 
simply repeated by Lehman, have been “material” because there was no “substantial 
likelihood” that a “reasonable investor” would have viewed those generalities as 
“significantly alter[ing] the ‘total mix’ of information.”345 Hence, Lehman arguably 
would not have been required to disclose them.346 
It is hard to see what Lehman could have added by its own disclosure, unless it 
could have forecasted the probability that a lender pullback would cripple Lehman’s 
liquidity.347 To make such a forecast, Lehman would have had to predict the probability 
 
343. See FCIC Hearing, supra note 107, at 188 (discussing JPM’s concern over the September 13 
through 14 weekend that—even after Lehman posted the last $5 billion—JPM would risk disaster if it 
unwound on September 15 because lenders might not agree to repo for the next night). 
344. After the second test period began, stories in the financial press and observations by industry 
participants recognized that Bear had foundered in part because of its inability to obtain repo financing and 
further recognized that such financing could become unavailable even when a dealer offered high-quality 
securities as collateral, suggesting that Lehman might encounter just such repo problems. See Susanne Craig, 
Lehman Finds Itself in Center of a Storm, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2008, at A1  (“Bear Stearns had difficulty 
getting access to a key market that it and firms like Lehman rely on to finance themselves day-to-day. This 
$4.7 trillion market, known as the securities repurchase, or ‘repo,’ market, enables financial institutions to 
obtain short-term, often overnight, cash loans by selling securities—either theirs or clients’—and agreeing to 
repurchase them a day or so later when the loan matures. Lehman executives began pulling together data on 
the firm’s funding alternatives, including untapped bank lines, in case it faced difficulties in the repo 
market.”); Frantz & Young, Moody’s Affirms Lehman’s A1 Rating, supra note 263, at 1 (“The global credit 
crisis has broadly affected asset values and the willingness of market participants to provide financing—in 
some cases even on the highest quality collateral.”); Serena Ng & Randall Smith, Another Source of Quick 
Cash Dries Up: Firms Rethink Reliance on “Repo” Financing as Conditions Tighten, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 
2008, at C1 (“It was the market failure to roll repo—securitized lending agreements—that appears to have 
been Bear’s problem,’ Jeffrey Rosenberg, Bank of America’s head of credit strategy research, said in a report 
analyzing Bear’s problem.”).  
 And Lehman knew that these risks were severe. Secretary Paulson contacted Lehman’s CEO in June to 
warn him that his firm might not survive another loss in quarter three. Examiner Report, supra note 1, at    
609–10. 
345. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988) (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 
426 U.S. 438, 448–49 (1976)).  
346. See 1 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 3.4[2] at 320 (6th ed. 2009) 
(“The basic dividing line between what has to be disclosed and what information may be withheld is 
determined by the concept of materiality . . . .”). 
347. The fact that Lehman shareholders knew or could know from public information that there was a 
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of some combination of events that would suddenly alarm lenders who—instead of 
adjusting terms—would refuse to loan at all. Any such prediction would also have had 
to take into account the dynamic between lenders, as each of them tried to decide 
whether a sufficient number of other lenders would continue to loan to Lehman in order 
to keep the firm alive.348 The prediction would also have had to anticipate the further 
dynamic created by possible lender concern that the clearing bank would not unwind, 
and the interaction between these two dynamics.349 In light of these complexities, 
Lehman could neither have made a reliable forecast of lender flight nor given its 
shareholders facts so that they could make a reliable forecast. The securities law axiom 
that one company need not guess at the future actions of other companies applies here 
in fullest force.  
There is, however, one complicating factor. The PDCF that the Fed created after 
the Bear events potentially mitigated the effect of lender flight, and Lehman’s 
disclosures implicitly suggested that the PDCF would mitigate any lender flight from 
Lehman.350 If private sector lenders left, Lehman could simply borrow through the 
PDCF—and thereby stop the run or at least cabin its effect. 
But all of this depended on Lehman’s willingness to use the PDCF. Initially, 
Lehman seemed to embrace the new backstop. The Lehman CFO stated during the 
March 18 conference call that Lehman had “not yet used the facility” but that “the rate 
and margin levels are very attractive.”351 At least one analyst took this to mean that 
“[Lehman] plans to access the Fed facility in the future.”352 Another analyst 
commented that liquidity risk was “off the table” for Lehman “at least in one sense” 
because the PDCF “significantly reduces run-on-the-bank risk.”353 
Lehman did indeed use the PDCF during and immediately in the aftermath of the 
Bear crisis—borrowing through the PDCF on March 18, 19, 20, 24, 25, and 26.354 But 
Lehman financed through the PDCF only once more—on April 16—before it filed for 
 
risk that triparty lenders would pull back did not necessarily let Lehman off the hook because, for example, 
Item 303 can require a company to disclose the “impact” of a publicly known trend on that company because 
that impact is “certainly not public knowledge.” Litwin v. Blackstone Grp., L.P., 634 F.3d 706, 716, 718–19  
(2d Cir. 2011). But the impact of lender flight depended on Lehman’s use of the PDCF. See supra notes 164–
68 and infra notes 351–61 and accompanying text. 
348. See supra note 171 and accompanying text for a discussion of the self-magnifying dynamic of the 
triparty repo market that caused some lenders to discontinue lending because other lenders had. 
349. See supra notes 172–174 and accompanying text for a discussion of the lenders’ fear that the 
clearing bank would not unwind and the clearing bank’s fear that the lenders would not fund. 
350. See supra notes 167 (identifying securities qualifying for PDCF funding) and 305 (providing 
Lehman’s breakdown of securities funding repos by categories of securities, many of which met the PDCF 
qualifications). 
351. Lehman First Quarter Conference Call, supra note 21, at 10, 16 (Erin Callan, CFO, adding that the 
PDCF was “just incredibly attractive”).  
352. Mike Mayo et al., Lehman Brothers Holding: 1Q08 Earnings, DEUTSCHE BANK GLOBAL MKTS. 
RES. (Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc., New York, N.Y.), Mar. 18, 2008.  
353. Van Hesser & Daphne Fang, Lehman Brothers: One Day at a Time, HSBC CREDIT RES. (HSBC 
Sec. (USA), Inc., New York, N.Y.), June 11, 2008, at 3. But the report nevertheless rated Lehman’s debt 
“underweight,” meaning that the analyst expected that debt to “underperform [that] of other issuers in the 
sector over the next six months.” Id. at 1, 7.   
354. Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 1398–99.  
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bankruptcy on September 15.355 Most importantly, the firm did not turn to this 
emergency backup at all during the week before that filing.356 Lehman apparently did 
not do so because, by early June, Lehman concluded that a “stigma” attached to PDCF 
funding.357 
This, of course, raises immediately the question of whether Lehman should have 
explicitly disclosed its aversion to the PDCF. Two reasons suggest not, even though 
that aversion was almost certainly material. First, while Lehman never formally 
announced that its view of the Fed facility had changed from “attractive” to 
“stigmatizing,” the securities laws very arguably did not require Lehman to reveal any 
such change of heart.358 And public comments during the second period at least hinted 
at this Lehman change, perhaps sufficiently to make the point to Lehman shareholders 
and those who advised them. For example, on June 3, the Lehman Treasurer Paolo 
Tonucci went out of his way to squelch a rumor that Lehman was borrowing through 
the PDCF.359 Lehman also made a point to state, in its June 16 conference call on 
second-quarter financial results, that it had no outstanding balance with the backstop at 
the end of that quarter.360 At least one analyst report drew attention to that fact.361 
Second, to have mandated Lehman to do more would have constituted poor 
policy. If indeed publicity about the firm’s use of the PDCF would have itself initiated 
or aggravated a decline in market confidence that could have been fatal to Lehman’s 
life, then requiring Lehman to publicly acknowledge this stigma would have 
aggravated the very effect Lehman feared if, as a last resort, the firm had turned to the 
backstop. Forcing the disclosure would have reduced the survival value of the tool the 
 
355. Id. at 1399. Lehman considered doing so on Sunday, September 14, 2008, but could not do so then 
for technical reasons. Id. at 722.   
356. Id. at 1399.  
357. See id. at 1397 & n.5364 (“In an internal [June 4, 2008] e-mail, Lehman personnel appeared to view 
the PDCF as a net negative, writing that Lehman could not use it due to its ‘stigma,’ owing to the fact that 
‘should the Fed disclose the [PDCF] borrowers, it would likely further damage confidence in the institutions 
that tapped the facilities.’”). 
358. The securities laws impose a requirement that a company update plans or predictions only in very 
limited circumstances. See United States v. Schiff, 602 F.3d 152, 170 (3d Cir. 2010) (explaining that “the duty 
[to update] has only been plausible in cases where the initial statement concerns ‘fundamental[ ] change[s]’ in 
the nature of the company—such as a merger, liquidation, or takeover attempt—and when subsequent events 
produce an ‘extreme’ or ‘radical change’ in the continuing validity of that initial statement” (alteration in 
original) (citing In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1433–34 (3d. Cir. 1997))). 
359. See Lehman Bros. Denies Rumors, Says It Has Plenty of Cash, USA TODAY (June 3, 2008, 3:51 
PM), http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/banking/2008-06-03-lehman-denial_N.htm (“Lehman Bros. 
(LEH) on Tuesday denied that it was forced to tap the Federal Reserve[] . . . to stave off cash problems. . . . 
Shares of the company tumbled around 15% Tuesday afternoon after market rumors surfaced that it was forced 
to borrow from the Federal Reserve[] . . . to maintain operations. . . . ‘We did not access the primary      
broker-dealer facility,’ said . . . Lehman’s treasurer. ‘The last time we accessed the facility was on April 16 for 
testing purposes.’”). 
360. Lehman Second Quarter Conference Call, supra note 23, at 14 (Ian Lowitt, CFO, stating that 
Lehman “tested the Fed’s new primary dealer credit facility on occasion with no outstanding balance at quarter 
end” and that the “last time [the company] accessed the facility was April 16 on an overnight basis”); see also 
June 10 Preliminary Q2 Figures Call, supra note 216, at 9–10 (Erin Callan, CFO, making a similar statement). 
361. See Whitney et al., LEH 2Q08 Net Results, supra note 256, at 4 (repeating the zero-balance 
statement as one of the “Key Takeaways” from the call).  
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government had created to insure survival. 
In sum, Lehman’s disclosure during the second period was disappointing—not 
only in failing to provide a simple number for total triparty repos but also in failing to 
reveal that JPM was demanding first daytime haircuts and then a collateral cushion. 
Disclosing those demands would have alerted stockholders that this threat to Lehman’s 
liquidity was not only theoretically possible but actually occurring. However, the most 
useful information—the probability of future large collateral demands (including $10 
billion in Lehman’s last week of life)—was not reasonably known to Lehman and so 
could not have been disclosed. Similarly, Lehman could not have predicted the 
combinations of information that would cause some lenders to suddenly and 
completely refuse to lend, the probability of such a combination occurring, or the 
dynamics introduced by (1) each lender guessing whether other lenders would lend, (2) 
each lender guessing whether JPM would unwind, and (3) JPM guessing whether a 
sufficient number of lenders would lend. While Lehman knew by the end of the second 
period that it was reluctant to use the PDCF liquidity backstop, requiring Lehman to 
reveal its concern that emergency resort to PDCF financing would likely worsen a 
crisis of confidence would have been counterproductive. Revealing this concern would 
have increased the probability of that very effect if the firm had changed its view and, 
in order to avoid a liquidity heart attack, turned to the Fed facility. Lehman had little 
useful information to add to public information and, what little it had, would have been 
harmful rather than helpful to provide. 
B. Frustration of Endgame Risk Disclosure 
Lehman died not just because it suffered a cardiac arrest, but because neither it 
nor the government could resuscitate the firm through a merger. The U.S. government 
refused to contribute taxpayer money to facilitate such a merger.362 And, although other 
Wall Street firms were willing to put up cash to grease the skids for the last-hope 
merger partner, the British securities regulator (the FSA) would not, in the end, waive a 
shareholder vote, as was absolutely necessary to make the deal with that partner go.363 
Consider now whether Lehman could have disclosed—in either test period—the risks 
inherent in such an endgame. 
1. January 2008 
While Lehman’s disclosures said absolutely nothing about endgame risks in the 
first period,364 it is hard to see how Lehman could have provided any useful 
information about such risks in January 2008. The company could have said that, if 
worse came to worst, it would seek a transforming transaction or a merger. It could 
have stated that there were only a limited number of large, multiservice financial 
institutions that would be likely merger candidates. It also could have said that any of a 
number of regulators might play a role in either assisting such a merger or approving 
 
362. See PAULSON, supra note 14, at 192 (stating that Paulson told Wall Street leaders that “there could 
be no government money involved in any rescue”).  
363. See Part I.C.2 for a discussion of why Lehman ultimately failed.  
364. See Part II.E.1 for a discussion of Lehman’s disclosures in this period. 
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the steps necessary for a merger or other deal. It could have concluded the discussion 
by reminding shareholders that—for all these reasons—there could be no assurance 
that Lehman would be able, if in extremis, to complete a lifesaving deal. 
But investors would have known all of that to begin with. Government-facilitated 
mergers of failing financial firms into stronger ones had been a favored technique for 
years.365 No securities law rule required Lehman to restate this generality.366 
The really helpful information—bearing on the particular risks that Lehman’s 
survival strategy would run at the time it had to be implemented—was unknowable in 
January 2008. Lehman could not have then predicted which potential merger partners it 
or the government might find, which government regulators would play a leading role 
in an endgame, or the political climate that would dictate the appetite the government 
would have to provide financial assistance for a Lazarus deal. 
2. March 10 to June 20, 2008 
During this second period, Bear shareholders reaped about $10 per share from the 
Bear-JPM merger, and the government assisted in the transaction by financing $29 
billion of Bear assets that JPM did not want.367 Thus, the Bear experience could have 
prompted Lehman to give general warnings—that any Lehman endgame would be 
subject to the risks that only a few large financial firms would be realistic candidates 
for a last-minute merger, that any of those candidates might not want some of 
Lehman’s assets, that those assets might have to be sold to some specially created and 
subsidized entity, and that the entire deal might fail for want of government financial 
support or necessary regulatory approval. But widespread publicity about the Bear 
events revealed all those risks to the world, including to Lehman shareholders. The 
general warnings set out above would have added nothing useful. Only more specific 
disclosures would have helped shareholders estimate the probability that a Lehman 
endgame would fail with the Lehman shareholders wiped out as a result, and Lehman 
no more had such specifics in the second period than it did in the first. 
While—after Bear—Lehman could have predicted that the Fed and Treasury 
would be the lead regulators in an endgame, Lehman could not have predicted those 
regulators’ attitude when the crunch came. On the one hand, the government’s very 
active role in helping Bear avoid bankruptcy suggested that the government might 
similarly assist Lehman. On the other hand, the considerable criticism of federal aid to 
the JPM-Bear merger suggested possibly diminished government enthusiasm for a 
 
365. See James R. Barth & Martin A. Regalia, The Evolving Role of Regulation in the Savings and Loan 
Industry, in THE FINANCIAL SERVICES REVOLUTION 113, 136 (Catherine England & Thomas Huertas eds., 
1988) (noting legislation in 1982 to give the Federal Home Loan Bank Board “the authority to arrange mergers 
of failing savings and loan associations with other associations, commercial banks” and other institutions); 
Gillian Garcia, The FSLIC Is “Broke” in More Ways Than One, in THE FINANCIAL SERVICES REVOLUTION, 
supra, at 235, 238–41 (stating that “[m]ergers have historically been . . . the preferred way of disposing of 
failed thrifts” and displaying a table showing the number of mergers from 1980–86 that were arranged by the 
Federal Home Loan Ban Board without financial assistance, and those that were arranged by the Federal 
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation with financial assistance). 
366. See supra notes 345–46 and accompanying text for a description of material information as 
information that adds to that already known.  
367. See supra notes 10–20 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Bear-JPM merger. 
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replay if Lehman looked like it was sinking beneath the waves.368 Lehman could not 
have known—any better than its shareholders—whether the inclination to help would 
dominate fear of further negative publicity. 
Moreover, that balance would be affected by events that had not yet unfolded in 
June—most particularly the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac receiverships.369 Lehman 
could not have predicted those receiverships by the end of the second period, nor the 
impact they would have on government help if Lehman began to die. Similarly, 
Lehman could not have foreseen by June 20 that Barclays would emerge as a potential 
savior.370 And it was far beyond possible for Lehman to predict the role that the FSA 
would play, in the end, by refusing—even after pleas from top U.S. officials—to waive 
a British listing requirement for a shareholder vote on an essential guarantee.  
Finally, requiring Lehman to predict the probability that the U.S. government 
would add dollars to a lifesaving Lehman deal would have been unfair because the 
government—with good reason—deliberately concealed any such inclination. Thus, 
even as Secretary Paulson arranged the meeting of Wall Street CEOs for the weekend 
beginning Friday evening September 12, in order to urge them to fund the purchase of 
Lehman assets that any Lehman buyer did not want, an internal Fed email advised that 
“[w]e should have in mind a maximum number [that] we are willing to finance before 
the meeting starts, but not divulge our willingness to do so to the consortium.”371 That 
made sense from the government’s point of view. It could force the maximum 
contribution from the private sector by vehemently stating that the government would 
contribute nothing, even if that was not true.372 But the government’s incentive to hide 
its intentions that this anecdote reveals would likely have frustrated any Lehman effort 
to publicly and reliably predict government action. 
In sum, and as to both test periods, any description of a possible endgame and the 
risks that made successful completion of an endgame problematic would necessarily 
have been so general that the description would have added nothing of value for 
Lehman shareholders. Moreover, requiring Lehman to discuss an endgame might have 
itself shaken confidence in the firm and thereby made its demise more probable. The 
disclosure might have thereby imposed a cost without any significant benefit. While 
 
368. See supra notes 193–97 and accompanying text for a discussion of the government intervention in 
the financial sector before the Lehman crisis and the political reaction to those events.  
369. See supra notes 194–97 and accompanying text. 
370. See supra notes 200–08 and accompanying text for a description of the circumstances surrounding 
Barclays’ emergence as a potential merger partner. 
371. Attachment to E-mail from Patrick M. Parkinson, Deputy Dir. of Research and Statistics, Fed. 
Reserve, to Don Kohn, Vice Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Scott Alvarez, Gen. Counsel, Fed. Reserve Bank of New 
York, and Brian Madigan, Dir. of Monetary Affairs, Fed. Reserve (Sept. 11, 2008, 06:55 EST) (emphasis 
added), available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-testimony/2010-0901-Lehman-Brothers-
Chronology.pdf. 
372. Paulson told the Wall Street leaders that “there could be no government money involved in any 
rescue.” PAULSON, supra note 14, at 192.  But both his later statements—and Geithner’s statements during 
Lehman weekend—suggest that the government might well have put up money had a buyer been found.  See 
Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 617–18 (“On September 11, 2008, Geithner’s discussions with the [FSA] 
left open the possibility that there would be Government assistance.”); PAULSON, supra note 14, at 208 
(distinguishing Lehman from Bear because, “unlike with Bear Stearns, the Fed’s hands were tied because we 
had no buyer”). 
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that cost could have been reduced had all financial institutions been required to discuss 
endgames373—whether they were candidates for liquidity death or not—the resulting 
disclosures would likely have been so general as to be virtually useless.374 The unique 
circumstances, as well as the associated risks, that would dominate at the particular 
time that Lehman needed a rescue were impossible to foresee in either January or from 
March 10 through June 20. 
C. The Factors That Defeated Disclosure of Extreme Liquidity Risk 
Lehman’s case raises grave questions concerning whether the federal securities 
law disclosure scheme can, realistically, warn of a cash cardiac arrest at a financial firm 
in time for equity investors to sell at a price that recovers a substantial portion of their 
investment. Seven characteristics of an extreme liquidity crisis combine to defeat 
timely warning. 
First, like a heart attack, fatal illiquidity develops suddenly. Bear ran out of cash 
and credit within a week.375 So did Lehman.376 When the crisis strikes, it culminates 
with frightening speed.377 
Second, dynamics between actors outside the failing financial firm play a key 
role. In Lehman’s case, each overnight lender had to gauge whether sufficient other 
lenders would loan before committing its own money for another nocturnal repo.378 
Each lender also had to gauge whether JPM would unwind the next morning.379 JPM, 
in turn, had to gauge—before unwinding—whether sufficient lenders would return so 
that Lehman could pay off the intraday loan, and what collateral cushion JPM needed 
to guard against the possibility that it might be wrong in predicting continued nighttime 
lending.380 The interplay between all of these actors was complex and fast moving, as 
 
373. For example, bank holding companies with $50 billion or more in assets must today prepare and 
file resolution plans. Definitions, 12 C.F.R. § 243.2 (2014); Resolution Plan Required, 12 C.F.R. § 243.3 
(2014). The plans must include a “range of specific actions to be taken by the . . . company to facilitate a rapid 
and orderly resolution of the . . . company . . . in the event of material financial distress or failure of the . . . 
company.” Id. § 243.4(c)(1)(ii).  
374. At least the publicly released portions of the resolution plans now required provide little 
information that is not otherwise public and that would materially assist investors in understanding the banks’ 
endgames in the event of a liquidity disaster. E.g., BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION RESOLUTION PLAN, BANK 
OF AMERICA, N.A. RESOLUTION PLAN, FIA CARD SERVICES, N.A. RESOLUTION PLAN (2013), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/resolution-plans/boa-1g-20131001.pdf.  
375. See supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text for a discussion of how fast Bear Stearns ran out of 
cash.  
376. See supra note 170 and accompanying text for a discussion of how fast Lehman ran out of cash. 
377. Serious financial writing recognizes how swiftly liquidity can collapse. See, e.g., Jean-Charles 
Rochet & Xavier Vives, Coordination Failures and the Lender of Last Resort: Was Bagehot Right After All?, 
in LIQUIDITY AND CRISES, supra note 175, at 293, 298 (using in a model an “explicitly short time horizon (say, 
two days) that corresponds to liquidity crises” in “the ‘modern’ form of bank run—that is, large investors 
refusing to renew their [loans] on the interbank market”). 
378. See supra note 171 and accompanying text for a discussion of the dynamic between lenders. 
379. See supra note 173 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the clearing bank–lender 
dynamic affected lenders. 
380. See supra note 172 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the clearing bank–lender 
dynamic affected the clearing bank. 
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illustrated by JPM’s two demands, each for $5 billion in additional collateral, during 
Lehman’s last week.381 
Third, the government’s key role can be decisively influenced by the very 
particular political context at the time the crisis occurs. It was Lehman’s extreme 
misfortune to enter its death spiral after the Bear rescue and sandwiched between the 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac conservatorships and the AIG bailout—an awful interval 
in which to seek government help.382 
Fourth, the potential merger partners available for an endgame deal depend on the 
health and strategy of the firms of a size (and in a business sufficiently related) to 
quickly absorb the one clutching its chest in pain. At the end, one of Lehman’s suitors 
might have been predicted—BofA.383 But the one coming closest to a deal—
Barclays—came out of the blue,384 dragging with it FSA regulation of Barclays’ 
relationship with its own shareholders.385 
Fifth, the strange calculus of confidence can wildly distort results. Lehman had 
access to the PDCF, a backstop specifically set up after the Bear events in March to 
help firms like Lehman survive exactly the kind of catastrophe Lehman faced in 
September.386 Yet because Lehman feared that use of the backstop would sap what 
little confidence the firm still commanded, it did not resort to the fallback for even a 
single dollar as it went to its death.387 Suffering a heart attack, the firm turned its back 
on the electric paddles. 
Sixth, while the players in Lehman’s last drama were all sophisticated financial 
participants,388 some of them, unpredictably, acted much like retail bank customers 
during a run.389 Lenders proved information insensitive until shock. Instead of 
gradually increasing haircuts and interest rates to account for an increasing risk of a 
 
381. See supra notes 124–33 and accompanying text for a discussion of JPM’s collateral demands. 
382. See supra notes 193–97 and accompanying text for a discussion of the political resistance generated 
by assistance to financial institutions. 
383. Lehman had talks with BofA as early as July. See Examiner Report, supra note 1, at 694–95.  
384. The Examiner’s description of Lehman’s “Survival” efforts does not mention contacts with 
Barclays, about a rescue deal, prior to the communications in the last week and weekend preceding the 
bankruptcy. Id. at 703–10. 
385. See supra notes 208–13 and accompanying text for a discussion of how FSA regulations helped 
push Lehman into bankruptcy. 
386. See supra notes 164–67 and accompanying text for a description of the PDCF. 
387. See supra notes 354–57 and accompanying text for a discussion of the relationship between 
Lehman and PDCF. 
388. See supra note 153 and accompanying text for a discussion of the type of institutions lending 
Lehman money. 
389. In a classic run on a retail bank, depositors are disconcerted by bad news or rumors. Each depositor 
worries that others will take out their money and leave the bank without funds. Each therefore races the others 
to withdraw. Franklin Allen et al., An Introduction to Liquidity and Crises, in LIQUIDITY AND CRISES, supra 
note 175, at 3, 22. The modern bank run, however, features “large investors refusing to renew [loans].” Rochet 
& Vives, supra note 377, at 298. That is exactly what happened to Bear and Lehman. FCIC REPORT, supra 
note 10, at 291 (“Bear experienced runs by repo lenders . . . .”); see also COPELAND, REPO RUN EVIDENCE, 
supra note 43, at 19, 26 (stating that Lehman experienced a “run” and that lender flight in the triparty repo 
market can resemble a traditional bank run).   
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Lehman default, they simply stopped lending altogether.390 
Seventh, many of the actors had strong incentives to conceal their intentions from 
Lehman, with the lenders and JPM wanting to preserve a valuable business relationship 
until they decided it was clearly in their interest to take actions draining Lehman of its 
cash, and the government wanting to conceal any willingness to contribute money to an 
endgame merger in order to maximize the contribution the government could coax 
from others.391 
In light of these factors, it was impossible for Lehman to foresee any of the details 
that would kill it. Since it could not foresee those details, it could not warn of those 
details. And general warnings would have had little value. 
While reforms have attempted to reduce the particular risks so prominent in 
Lehman’s case,392 the nature of large modern financial institutions and modern markets 
could easily bring many of the factors set out above into play again, which could 
frustrate timely and effective disclosure in future cases where financial firms face 
extreme liquidity risk. If not in risky repos, those firms will engage in other 
complicated transactions. Those transactions will involve multiple parties. Each of 
those parties will have its own set of goals, and each will act only after considering the 
possible actions of the others, so that the players involved in any particular type of 
 
390. See supra notes 147–54 and accompanying text for a description of the abrupt lender flight from 
Lehman without adjusting terms. 
391. See supra note 371 and accompanying text. 
392. A New York Fed task force made a series of recommendations to reduce risks created by triparty 
repos. See 2012 PAYMENTS RISK COMM., supra note 75, at 14–21. Most importantly, those recommendations 
sought “the practical elimination of intraday credit” resulting from the morning unwind. Id. at 2–5. 
Implementation continues. The Federal Reserve reported in early 2014 that “the two clearing banks are 
providing over a trillion dollars less in intraday credit to market participants on a daily basis today than in 
February 2012” because “[b]oth clearing banks [JPM and Bank of New York Mellon] have . . . end[ed] the 
daily unwind of cash and collateral for non-maturing trades and redesign[ed] the process for settling maturing 
trades in a more liquidity-efficient manner,” and because “some dealers [have] extend[ed] the tenor and 
ladder[ed] the maturity of their repo books, particularly for less liquid securities, so that maturities are less 
concentrated on any given day than they were in the past, reducing their need for credit.” Update on Tri-Party 
Repo Infrastructure Reform, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., (FEB. 13, 2014), 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/statements/2014/0213_2014.html. It is unclear whether the reforms 
can change the information insensitive until shock nature of a significant portion of the triparty lenders.  
 As to endgames, the 2010 financial-reform law provides an “orderly liquidation” process for systemically 
important financial firms that are in default or in danger of default and further provides that the liquidation 
must be implemented so that shareholders bear any loss. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5384(a)(1), 5386(2) (2012). But the 
liquidation process cannot begin unless the Treasury Secretary determines that “no viable private sector 
alternative is available to prevent the default,” which implies that a merger of the ailing firm into a healthy 
firm is still the preferred alternative toward which the government will work. Id. § 5383(b)(3). While the new 
law seems designed to stop government bailouts of huge financial firms, id. at §§ 5392(b), 5394(a), the law 
could always be changed. The probability that Congress might do so during a crisis arguably increased with 
the news that the government loan to Maiden Lane LLC in the JPM-Bear deal was repaid with interest in June 
2012, that the subordinated note to JPM was repaid with interest in November 2012, and that the government 
“will receive 100 percent of future cash flows generated from the remaining ML LLC assets.” Maiden Lane 
Transactions, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/maidenlane.html (last visited 
May 21, 2014). See supra note 19 and accompanying text for a discussion of the government’s role in 
financing the Bear-JPM merger. Hence, all the endgame complexities and risks remain—as does the 
unlikelihood of accurately assessing and disclosing those risks in a sufficiently particular way to be helpful. 
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transaction may generate a small-system dynamic. That dynamic may play out quickly, 
with frightening, immediate, and disastrous results on firm liquidity. In an industry in 
which reputation is key, options designed to break a dynamic may go unused for fear 
that using a circuit breaker will do more harm than good. Government intervention to 
save the day will continue to depend on the politics of the moment, influenced heavily 
by the events close in time to a firm’s crisis. Virtually all of the important players may 
want to hold their cards close to their chests. Securities disclosures may be completely 
unable to capture the extent of these risks in a timely way. 
CONCLUSION 
The lessons specific to Lehman and financial firms more generally have serious, 
and even more far-reaching, implications for securities disclosure overall. United States 
securities law rests, fundamentally, on the idea that public companies will publish facts 
that reveal risks so that investors can choose to run those risks or not.393 This notion 
has fueled a steady increase in disclosure requirements, with Regulations S-K and S-
X—the principal set of disclosure rules for public companies394—growing by fifty-
three percent between 2000 and 2012.395 Legislative and regulatory reactions to swift 
and unexpected corporate failures have fueled that growth.396 
The Lehman case suggests, however, that sometimes publicly traded companies 
cannot realistically disclose risks in a helpful and timely way, and that the risks that 
they cannot so disclose may be the ones most important to their shareholders. What 
could be more important, after all, than the risk that a company might suddenly fall into 
ruin for want of cash to conduct daily operations? Disturbing as it is, the large lesson is 
that the securities law panacea—risk disclosure, and ever more risk disclosure—will 
not always work. Sometimes, we cannot predict a heart attack. 
 
393. See LOUIS LOSS ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 42–49 (6th ed. 2011) 
(contrasting the view that securities law should prevent investors from “making bad bargains,” with the view 
that the law should simply require truthful disclosure that investors would then use to make decisions; with the 
disclosure philosophy prevailing).  
394. Regulation S-K sets out the narrative disclosures that public companies must make and Regulation 
S-X prescribes the rules for required financial statements. 1 HAZEN, supra note 346, § 3.4[5][A] at 342. 
395. In 2000, Regulation S-K occupied pages 340 to 448 of the relevant volume of the Code of Federal 
Regulations, and Regulation S-X spanned pages 215 to 292. 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.1-01–210.12-29 (2000); 17 
C.F.R. §§ 229.10–229.1016 (2000). Together they totaled 187 pages. In 2012, Regulation S-K covered pages 
340 to 523, and Regulation S-X pages 236 to 337. 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.10–210.12-29 (2012); 17 C.F.R.             
§§ 229.10–229.1208 (2012). Together they totaled 286 pages. 
396. For example, Enron’s troubles related in part to special purpose entities that kept debt and losses off 
Enron’s reported balance sheet and income statement in order to “present [Enron] more attractively” to “Wall 
Street analysts and [credit] rating agencies.” See WILLIAM C. POWERS, JR., ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION 
BY THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP. 37 (2002). 
Precisely to address the use of off-sheet financing to disguise financial results, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002, and a resulting addition to Reg S-K, requires disclosure of such arrangements. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204 § 401(a), 116 Stat. 745 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(j) (2012)); Disclosure in 
Management’s Discussion and Analysis About Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements and Aggregate Contractual 
Obligations, Securities Act Release No. 33-8,182, Exchange Act Release No. 34-47,264, 68 Fed. Reg. 5982 
(Feb. 5, 2003) (adding subpart (a)(4) to Reg. S-K Item 303, 17 C.F.R. 229.303(a)(4)).  
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